American Occupations and Police Reform in Japan and Iraq: A Comparative Analysis
by Brian Frydenborg- May 2011

I.) Introduction

Over 2,000 years ago, Cicero noted that “We are in bondage to the law in order that we may be free” (Pro Cluentio 53). Today, rule of law is considered essential to any society for it to be able to conduct its affairs through self government, considered the ideal at least in the so-called “Western” world and certainly as promoted by the United Nations. There are several basic requirements for any society to function based on rule of law, as opposed to, say, brute force or fear. There must not only be laws, most of which are viewed as just by most of the population, and therefore followed in part because the population subscribes to them, but there must be ways of enforcing the law, adjudicating disputes, deterring illegal action, and punishing those who break the laws. Police, then, form a vital function for any law-based (and in the “Western” and UN view, any just) society, for police at times perform all of these functions. Just laws in combination with threat of punishment covers deterrence for the majority of the population; having just one or the other results in higher levels of non-compliance, as people will break laws they do not respect when they are able, and the less restrained will break laws without a societal force that will make them see the threat of personal loss from punishment outweigh the personal gain from breaking the law. Police alone are not a sufficient condition for rule of law, though; how the police are trained and how they perform their jobs are vital, as are courts, jails, judges and lawyers. Policing and its functions are covered specifically in several parts of the Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO).1 This paper will focus on two examples of post-war police reform as carried out by the same actor, the United States Government, in Japan after WWII and in Iraq after the 2003 invasion.

Using a historical example from Japan to address issues in a modern operation in Iraq, contrary to those who might argue that the two are not worthy of comparison or are too different, provides some of the few relevant examples of such an action that are comparable. Commenting on the relationship between history and political science as fields that needed to work together more often, John Lewis Gaddis noted that

Our fields, therefore, may have more in common than their “narcissism of minor differences” has allowed them to acknowledge. Both disciplines fall squarely within the spectrum of “nonreplicable” sciences. Both trace processes over time. Both employ imagination. Both use counterfactual reasoning. But what about prediction, or at least policy implications? Most historians shy from these priorities like vampires confronted with crosses. Many political scientists embrace them enthusiastically…

…The point…is not so much to predict the future as to prepare for it. Training is not forecasting. What it does do is expand ranges of experience, both directly and vicariously, so that we can

increase our skills, our stamina-and, if all goes well, our wisdom. Here too there is, or at least could be, common ground for historians and political scientists: the terrain upon which to train may be more accessible-and hospitable-than at first glance it might appear to be. It deserves, at a minimum, joint exploration.²

This is, though, a qualitative, and not a quantitative process, nothing approaching a mathematical formula whereby if you plug in a certain variable, you are guaranteed a certain result. The classic small-N dilemma of comparative politics— that there are so few states in the world, especially when one is trying to find a similar state in a similar situation— that statistical analysis proves difficult, does not mean that one should not try analysis. James Phelps draws on Max Weber’s approach of taking a few case studies, which embraces the small-N problem and turns it into a whole type of research methodology, allowing the researcher to conduct “extensive dialog between…[his] ideas and the data.”³

Phelps notes that after WWII, there have been only four attempts by the U.S. government to establish democratic governance that have been successful: Germany and Japan just after the war, and Panama and Grenada more recently. With only four such successful operations to study in the modern era, one would almost be negligent in not looking at Japan.

II.) The Case of Japan

Japan had a brief period of democracy of its own development in the 1920s, known in Japan as the Taisho democracy, named after the Emperor of that time (Hirohito’s era would be known as the Showa era).⁴ Yet the police were always an incredibly strong, centralized body during the reform period. Japanese elites studied different European and American institutions during its modernization efforts of the Meiji Revolution/Restoration, beginning to model their country’s police system on the centralized national-level police of Germany and especially France starting in the 1870s (The United States, in contrast, has virtually no national police and policing is done mostly at the local level but the state level as well). The first reformed police officers were ex-samurai working for a new Metropolitan Police Department in Tokyo, beginning as a blend of civil and military. This kept in line with the tradition of samurai both as military leaders and authorities for civil order. Combined with traditional reverence for samurai and that the new police displayed traditional samurai symbols, the effect was to create a police that was viewed as above the people, not composed of normal citizens. Increasingly advised by German police, in the years 1885-1890 alone, police posts in Japan increased from 3,068 to 11,357 and society became much more monitored by the state; a police academy was also opened. An enormous amount of activities were regulated and monitored by police, taking over in many ways the civil functions of the samurai system, which had been in place for a millennium. Everything from controlling beggars to monitoring dance halls to enforcing an annual cleaning the people had to perform of their individual homes fell under police responsibility. The Kenpeitai, or secret/military police, and a Special Higher Police, or Tokko, tasked with monitoring political thought, were also created. Of the seven ranks, the top four were paid by the central government, the bottom three paid for by the prefectures but with subsidies from the central government. Rarely did the bottom ranks rise to the upper ranks, a division whereby the

central government further consolidated its control of the prefectures. The Tokko grew greatly in power, too, as time went on, routinely arresting demonstrators and activists, even searching students on college campuses for materials deemed inappropriate. “Thought” police thus were omnipresent. They particularly went after unions and labor groups. The legal system overall maintained guilt until innocence was proven, torture was common, and confessions expected as an act of cooperation, not necessarily an admission of guilt. Particularly feared and hated were the Kenpeitai.5

When Gen. MacArthur and his office the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) took over administration and governance of Japan after the Japanese surrender, the police were told not to disband, but to stay at their posts; however, the Tokko were disbanded, as were all police who worked on censorship, as were the hated Kenpeitai, whose “legitimate police functions” were handed over to civilian police. The entire military was disbanded except for 5,500 Naval Police. Infighting between different departments at SCAP over police reform occurred between Gen. Willoughby’s Intelligence and Public Safety Section and Gen. Whitney’s Government Section. Willoughby had as his advisors a retired NYPD Commissioner and a Michigan State Police Commissioner, cities of 50,000 or more with plans being modeled after the recommendations of the New Yorker, rural areas with less people on those of the Michigander. But Whitney did not accept these, saying they were not decentralized enough for a democratic system, and wanted separate local police for every region of 5,000 or more, and Willoughby countered with more unified version of his previous plan. MacArthur sided with Whitney and further stipulated that the local police should be completely independent of any central government police authority, and MacArthur’s directive became the 1947 Police Law. National rural police and municipal police were totally separate from each other, and the municipal police were administered and operated by local committees while the national rural police were administrated and funded nationally but operated day-to-day at the prefecture level. The police state was wholly dismantled by the end of 1947, and by January 1948, each prefecture had at least one police school, emphasizing democratic policing techniques, with national standards for training, which would take two months. Before 1948 ended, 79,000 recruits had gone through the basic two-month course, while 31,000 of these took an advanced additional set of courses. Also, after the immediate police staffing needs were met, entry-level training was increased to three months, and this system had the capacity to train 16,250 officers a year. At first, the police had been disarmed along with all other Japanese forces, but when this greatly hampered their ability to fight crime, the U.S. rearmed them with pistols from mid-1949 to mid-1951.6

Several unique conditions, and problems, characterized the context of the police setting. The police reform was aided by the fact that in the beginning, massive American troop deployments kept order and prevented chaos, starting with 430,000 American soldiers and civilians in December 1945, down to 72,000 troops and 3,500 military police in August 1947, though in principle they exercised indirect authority over Japan. In practice, they cooperated with the police, but in keeping most of the pre-surrender police on the force, this helped reinforce traditional fears and social hierarchies and impeded democratization. Unlike Germany, which saw a rise in violent crime during its postwar occupation, Japan generally did not see an increase in violent crime, though it did in property crimes. After 1947, Japanese police increased their resolution of cases from forty-nine percent to sixty-eight percent. In Japanese society, men into their mid-twenties had been considered youths, close to being juveniles, but in 1948 the law was redefined to keep juvenile crime issues limited to those involving people younger than twenty. At this time, too, every police station had a juvenile department, and generally, those under sixteen years

5 Phelps, 87-97. See also Eiji 295-296.
6 Ibid., 102-208. See also Eiji 297-299.
of age were not put in prison. One major problem was dealing with organized crime, which proved resilient against the new decentralized, more restrained, democratic police force in Japan. It was legislative action and an improving economy that lessened the need for a black market which eventually eroded the power of the crime bosses. The "inability" of the police to curb the black market was made painfully obvious after major fight right outside of a police station in a main district of Tokyo between hundreds of Korean gang members and over a thousand Japanese gang members. In general, when dealing with organized crime, the Japanese police seemed "venal if not thoroughly corrupt, harried and hapless if not completely incompetent."8

A process of recentralization would soon begin, however. Japan’s central government was reluctant to finance locally run police, and finance problems were a major hindrance to the development of the Japanese police. In particular, the inability to deal with civil unrest and labor agitation concerned both Japanese authorities and SCAP. In order to meet financial shortfall, many policy departments ended up accepting gifts from police support groups which ended up being tied to organized crime, in return for looking the other way, generally, when it came to organized crime. Also, with their reduced status, policing was no longer as lucrative a profession and finding good recruits was difficult; out of nearly 2,700 police recruited in 1948 in Tokyo, less than 900 had high school educations. Mass unrest and even riots, with a newly strong Communist Party agitating and making its voice heard, were beyond the Japanese police’s ability to control, and SCAP had to use American troops to deal with these disturbances. With the Chinese Communists winning the Chinese Civil War and tensions with the Soviets rising, SCAP in particular was unhappy with this situation and decided that it was time to “reverse course” in some areas, police decentralizing giving way to ideas of recentralization. The Japanese press, the people, and the prefectural governments pressed the central government of Japan to centralize the police force. Eventually, MacArthur allowed for the creation of the National Police Reserve, a 75,000-man force directly controlled by Japan’s central government, under the Prime Minister. The force, however, was not organized as a police force, but was organized along military lines and never operated as a police force. Though the new (SCAP devised) Japanese Constitution prohibited Japan from having a military, calling it a police force was seen as a way of being consistent. At this time, American troops were leaving Japan to fight in the Korean War, so this was obviously a factor. After MacArthur was relieved in Korea by President Truman in 1951, Japan soon amended the 1947 Police Law to go along with the Willoughby plans, which had a more centralized police force, and soon the vast majority of the villages, towns, and cities voted to give up their autonomous police forces to join a national police force. Only two years after the occupation ended, the new Japanese Prime Minister, amid much controversy, had a law passed which centralized all of Japan’s police, with most funding coming from the prefectures but some coming from the national government. Yet the democratic tendencies which had been implemented would not be undone, and stay with Japan today.9

In addition, Eiji notes that much of the recruitment pool for the National Police Reserve included many former Imperial Army soldiers, and that the reform of the Police Law two years after the occupation ended was so controversial that riots broke out in the Japanese legislature and that police had to,

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7 Ibid., 108-115.
8 John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 143-144.
9 Phelps, 115-119, 121-123.
“ironically,” put down the rioting. He also notes that the police reform was part of a general post-occupation trend of recentralization.10

As for judicial reform, the Supreme Court would now be the final arbiter on legal and constitutional questions, the patriarchal feudal legal traditions were abolished, women were given equal legal rights and the right to vote, and a Habeas Corpus law was passed. American troops were not subject to the Japanese judicial process.11

III.) The Case of Iraq

Unlike Japan, a nation-state for many centuries, Iraq as a state was the creation of European powers from several provinces of the Turkish Ottoman Empire after WWI. The British Empire ruled Iraq through a League of Nations Mandate shortly after the war until 1932. They had created a constitutional monarchy which in many ways still answered to the British Empire, as British troops remained stationed in Iraq and British officials dominated Iraqi politics and politicians. Several military coups occurred, and a pro-Nazi rebellion in the middle of WWII was crushed by a major British Army intervention. Further instability, coups, plots and revolutions kept Iraq unstable until 1968. Going back the to the 1920s, British and Indian Army personnel were contracted for key positions in the police after the end of Ottoman rule, which had favored Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. Sunnis were also favored during much of the British era. The British helped establish a professional police force, and training schools for them as well. Repressive political police saw their role grow after WWII, so that by 1958 Baghdad may have had 20,000 secret police alone, enough, it was said, for two to follow every educated man. When the Baathists seized power in 1968, the head of the secret police had been a key force in this seizure of power. His name was Saddam Hussein. The dreaded secret police were used by Hussein after he took over as sole President in 1979 not only to keep his own people in check, but to enforce Iraqi Army loyalty.12 In fact, it was the power of his old secret police that was one of the few major bases for Hussein’s power in his final decades as ruler of Iraq.13 After the Gulf War, the new sanctions regime prevented Iraq from being able to finance much of its police, and they became prone to high levels of corruption. Many police simply quit.14

The weakening of the key institution of Iraqi police before the 2003 invasion would greatly affect the nature of the subsequent American-led coalition military occupation. Condoleeza Rice had said that “The concept was that we would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold, everything from ministries to police forces.” Yet, when U.S. authorities allowed a frenzy of looting and violence to erupt immediately after the fall of Baghdad, police officers opted to stay at home to protect families, and the state virtually ceased to exist. When the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) empowered Iraqi exiles to form a new state structure, they proved ineffective at working with the few police and other

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11 Phelps, 119-121.
government officials left. In Iraq, the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) answered directly to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and was responsible for immediate postwar governance. It existed for fifty days before the U.S. invaded Iraq, and “identified twenty key facilities and structures that needed U.S. military protection during the invasion and after the fighting ended,” recommendations ignored by Rumsfeld. Ten days passed before the fall of Baghdad and the end of fighting before ORHA was even allowed to enter Iraq and begin operations, by which time “the physical and bureaucratic infrastructure for governance of Iraq had been destroyed.” Retired Gen. Garner, leading ORHA, was replaced and reorganized by former Ambassador Paul Bremmer into the CPA just four days after ORHA arrived in Iraq. Within a few weeks, Bremmer had announced the disbandment of the Iraqi Army and an intensive de-Baathification program, antagonizing hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, many with their own weapons or access to them. The Iraqi police disappeared, possibly to avoid either being targeted by U.S. troops or to avoid being targeted by remnants of Hussein’s own repressive regime, with many joining armed bands or local militias to continue corrupt methods that had become increasingly common during the years of UN sanctions. It would not be until the so-called “surge,” years later, that U.S. forces would make securing the Iraqi population a major priority of their own forces. 

In fact, Pentagon planners and the Secretary of Defense never finished their planning for Phase IV of their Iraq plan, Phase IV being “Post-Hostility or Stability Operations,” with only one of the four Civil Affairs officers in the planning staff for the operation even allowed to read the plan, the Civil Affairs Annex G of which was never even approved by the National Security Council (NSC). It is clear, then, that despite elements in written plans and the efforts of ORHA, the political appointees of the President, including the Secretary of Defense and the NSC, failed to do its job or put in the requisite effort needed to plan for Phase IV. Only 4,000 Iraqi police appeared to do their job for a country of over twenty-five million. Bremer responded to this situation by asking the U.S. military for 4,000 military police (MPs). In July of 2004, only 15,000 Iraqi police officers had come back for duty, up to 47,000 that August, though some estimates are as high as 65,000-75,000; this may be because some Iraqi police chiefs artificially inflated numbers so they could steal excess funds for personal use. With the loss of many police records during the initial looting in 2003, it is hard to obtain exact figures. Some 40,000 more police officers were necessary for a baseline level of security, and the government of Jordan agreed to begin training 1,500 police a month starting that November. Because of the desperate situation, the length of the training program “was significantly shortened.” Over $190 million was spent by the U.S. to improve the Jordanian facilities, over 320 international trainers brought in, and 32,000 police produced from Jordan, but despite that resourcing, training and screening were inadequate as “corruption and sectarianism ran rampant” throughout these new officers, all but making the whole project a waste. The Interior Minister was turning some of the police into Shia sectarian paramilitaries, and by fall 2007, some 14,000 police and other Interior Ministry officials had been fired for violations of human rights. An independent U.S. inquiry found that the National Police, the Border Police, and the Interior Ministry were all so corrupt and sectarian that they should be dissolved. Three and half years had been wasted. After a major operation with Shia militias in Basra in 2008, over 900 Basra police were dismissed for not doing their job, while after U.S. forces turned security over to Iraqi officials in the summer of 2009, one report

15 Dodge, 710, 718.
16 Phelps, 12-14.
stated that Interior Ministry officials were cooperating with insurgents and terrorists. Police themselves were possible victims of intimidation by Iraqi Special Operations Forces under the Prime Minister.\footnote{Ibid., 137, 139-141.}

For Phelps, several issues need to be considered. The decentralization of Iraqi police, in a sectarian situation, meant that various parts of the police and the Interior Ministry worked against each other at worst or, often, did not cooperate at best. Civilian oversight of police is problematic, and they remain a partially militarized force hardly ideal for civilian police functions, as they often have to fight insurgents and terrorists, supplementing the activities of the Iraqi military. Standardization remains problematic as some aspects are standardized like basic training or the curricula in the police academies, while others, like human rights training, come from a variety of international actors and may not be followed-up with proper subsequent training. The U.S. administration, even when dealing with reasonable or vital requests from its own military officers on the ground, was often inflexible or unhelpful. There was also inadequate border control. Apparently, Civil Affairs officers were not even assigned to work on the issue of the Iraqi police, or much at all in terms of public safety and order. Furthermore, corrections and judicial reform were not given appropriate attention hand-in-hand with police efforts. All these situations undermined the development of the Iraq police and their need for disbandment.\footnote{Ibid., 141-147}

Greener notes additional major problems as well. The police are in a constant state of threat. In the first three years of the U.S.-led occupation, an estimated 12,000 Iraq police and recruits were killed, and security was a major issue throughout the last decade, and remains so today. In general, “astonishingly little planning for a policing role was undertaken by US and other authorities.” When the U.S. Justice Department recommended 6,600 police personnel be tasked with building and training and overseeing the Iraqi police and postwar policing needs, only fifty arrived in the first nine-months. The made each trainer responsible for over fifty police stations. A year after this, only 375 police professionals were tasked to this issue. The training program in Jordan even eliminated field training entirely, while as of 2007, only 870 out of 1,500 needed judges were in place.\footnote{B. K. Greener, The New International Policing (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 80-91.}

Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton was in charge of developing the Iraq police in 2004, and after he retired in 2006, he described the efforts to deal with the police situation as a “disaster,” and that the first nine months of American efforts to reform the police before he took over revealed a stunning lack of progress, a failure to understand the man, train and equip functions, an unworkable command and control network, a logistics and administration system that didn’t work — in short, a national police and border force that were in complete disarray, ill-equipped, and with untrained leadership in dysfunctional facilities. We had a lot of work to do — we had lost nine months.\footnote{Paul D. Eaton, Senate Democratic Policy Committee Hearing “An Oversight Hearing on the Planning and Conduct of the War in Iraq “, 25 September 2006, 4, http://dpc.senate.gov/hearings/hearing38/eaton.pdf (last accessed May 8, 2011).}

Despite complaints about under-resourcing by Eaton, his pleas were generally ignored. In the same statement, he called on the President to replace Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense.\footnote{Ibid., 3-5.}

Even as recently as May 5\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, police were the target of a major attack south of Baghdad, with a car bomb being driven into a police headquarters entrance, killing at least fifteen and wounding dozens more.\footnote{Ibid., 3-5.}
IV.) Comparison and Conclusion

A comparison of the two proves fruitful. One thing that is very different is that in Japan Americans had a functioning government with which to work, while in Iraq, it either melted away or, when elements tried to work with U.S. officials, they were turned away by Bremmer despite the best intentions of ORHA. Japan certainly faced many domestic stability crises, but American troops did not land in a power vacuum. This was partly because the U.S. deployed hundreds of thousands of troops and established a total monopoly of violence over Japanese officials with a vigorous disarmament campaign, and partly because the government generally did not cease to function. In Iraq, Americans did land in a power vacuum, and failed to provide enough troops or the political willpower to restore order countrywide. For all the challenges Japanese police faced, chaos and mass death were not two of them, yet Iraqi police during the occupation were murdered in the thousands in spectacular attacks and even today continue to be targets of bloody violence. This lack of order contributed in Iraq to the establishment of a full-blown insurgency that greatly affected the operating environment for Iraqi police and potential police recruits. Caught up in the conflict and fearful for their own lives the lives of their families, they often became a party to the conflict instead of a force to help end the conflict. And while both Japanese and Iraqi police were highly corrupt during the occupations, for Japanese police this was by far the biggest flaw, while for Iraqi police it was one of many. Both operations also showed the problems of implementing rapid decentralization in cultures where this has not been the trend. In both cases, financing in a decentralized system with a weak economy proved problematic. In Japan, the people themselves and the changing world political situation helped to reverse this trend. In Iraq, the decentralization of the police helped to further increase the sectarian nature of the police. Unlike Japan, which was mostly homogenous religiously and ethnically, Iraqis had two major religious groups and three major ethnicities, and during the insurgency, they were generally a part of the problem and not the solution. Furthermore, without major security issues, the Japanese police greatly improved their performance in quick periods of time, and proved a valuable tool for SCAP in administering the occupation. In contrast, in the first years of the Iraqi police reform and training program, there were no major overall positive results, the first batch being so bad that they had to be disbanded. When training began to be taken more seriously, a full-blown insurgency, in which the Iraqi police were already a target, was underway. Another major difference is that Japan, as an island nation, remained relatively free from foreign influence during the occupation, while Iraq’s neighbors often proved destabilizing as American officials never made securing the borders a priority. Where things did go well, in the Kurdish north, this was because of the years-long autonomy of the Kurds, enforced by the old UN no-fly zones, and the Kurds’ own efforts, not the CPA or the Pentagon.

Finally, a major difference between MacArthur and Rumsfeld/Bremmer was that MacArthur was not reluctant to resource or get SCAP involved in any major aspect of Japanese life, was not afraid to be comprehensive and simultaneous in his approach, and eagerly took on the civil issues even though he was a military commander. Rumsfeld and Bremmer in some ways took a libertarian laissez-faire approach to nation building, letting many critical aspects of civilian life deteriorate untreated with an inability to adjust to the fact that the government of Iraq had disappeared. Rather than use the military after the

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police had disappeared help reestablish nationwide order, the Iraq Army was disbanded even as it offered to do so, and even Baghdad was chaotic for years. This and other major decisions fed fuel to the fire of violence and insurgency. Clearly, in his resourcing and actions, Rumsfeld did not even see Iraq’s national stability and protecting Iraqi civilians as a top priority or the Pentagon’s responsibility; a liberated Iraqi people would have to rely on themselves for protection. This only meant a trend of local, non-government militias and sectarian violence. One thing that some underestimate was the potential for chaos in Japan if massive numbers of American troops had not first secured order. It is very possible that American troops could also have faced an insurgency in the late 1940s in Japan if American planners had not prioritized establishing security so highly. That American planners in Iraq did not can be said to be a major if not the major cause for an insurgency as bad as the one that happened and is still ongoing. A 2005 RAND study noted that there is a “Golden Hour” of a few weeks or months after an invasion during which occupiers have a chance to create popular support and neutralize major spoilers before an insurgency is likely to develop. Failure to do so dramatically increases the threat of violent support and the occupation as being viewed as illegitimate and undesired by the population. More than any other reason, this may explain the base from which SCAP was able to build upon for success in Japan and the base from which sprang so many problems for Americans in Iraq. If anything, SCAP had enough forces to deal with far less of a Japanese government and more chaos, while American resourcing in 2003 was far less than what it would need for even a smaller country with somewhat less disorder.²³

List of Sources


