The How Behind

Roman Pax:

Selected Roman Operations Aimed at Establishing Peace and their Lessons for Modern Peace Operations

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7/1/2011
Rev. November 2011

July 2011- Independent Study GMU Dr. Bonnie Stabile

Readers are simultaneously entertained and educated by an account of causes and by seeing people choose the better course in any given situation

-Polybius, The Histories 6.2

Lucullus now turned his attention to the cities in Asia in order that, while he was at leisure from military enterprises, he might do something for the furtherance of justice and law.

-Plutarch, Parallel Lives, The Life of Lucullus 20

Let us see if by moderation we can win all hearts and secure a lasting victory, since by cruelty others have been unable to escape from hatred and to maintain their victory for any length of time…This is a new way of conquering, to strengthen one’s position by kindness and generosity. As to how this can be done, some ideas have occurred to me and many more can be found. I should like you to turn some attention to the matter.

-Caesar, Caesar to Oppius and Cornelius, Greeting
**Preface**

a.) Why I Chose This Topic

For much of American history until relatively recently, the educated elites of America, from the colonial era until into the 20th century, were steeped in an education that emphasized the Greco-Roman classics, learning Greek and Latin, and reading the authors of antiquity. Such trends were especially exemplified by the Founding Fathers. These elites who directed America’s national affairs for generations had the lessons of the classical world in their minds, and this world, though separated from our own by over a millennium-and-a-half, formed a significant part of the mindset of and context for these leaders when they came to power and shaped the course of America. Today, classics in modern American education have fallen steeply from their previously held esteem and do not have anywhere near the same influence on America’s leaders today, nor do they have anywhere near the same presence in the American elite mindset that it once did, “[a]nd yet the disappearance of this widespread erudition has not made the questions whose answers it had facilitated vanish with it.”

I myself never encountered the classics in elementary, middle, or high school, and even in college I did not have much of an experience with them. Almost by chance, I fell in love with an HBO television drama called *Rome*, and also enjoyed playing the video game *Rome: Total War*, shortly after I finished my undergraduate studies. One of my two majors in college was history (the other being politics) and I began, at first through the springboard of fiction and entertainment, to develop and immense appreciation for Roman history what the Romans were able to accomplish. Going past television and video games, I began a serious academic exploration of Rome, albeit on my own, for much of the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century. And, though there are 2

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vast differences between ancient Rome and the United States, between the ancient world and the modern, in many ways I saw some striking similarities and parallels between our two nations and our two worlds, despite the challenging differences in time and culture. And I realized that we had much to learn from Rome, particularly in the realm of public policy, and particularly in the realm of foreign policy. For years, then, I have been hoping to explore these themes in an academic setting. This paper, then, is my making good on this desire.

This paper intersects with another passion of mine: history. I was a politics and history double-major as an undergraduate. Politics as I have studied it and have come to understand it as a discipline is, in general, more concerned with theory, while history as I have studied it and have come to understand it is concerned more with specific examples of human behavior in specific periods of time. Beyond being merely interesting, history provides countless examples of human behavior by which to learn. Yet historians far too rarely try to draw lessons from this vast, rich tapestry of examples, case-studies-in-waiting even, and do not tend to use history to put together theories regarding human behavior that might inform how current policies should be crafted. Conversely, political scientists often spend so much of their energies on theorizing and avoid looking at the historians’ set of examples that might largely prove (or disprove) their theories. That is not to say that every political theory or modern problem in public policy has a neat or easy explanation waiting for it in an example or examples from history. But the idea is simple: in crafting policies aimed at dealing with and influencing human behavior, there can be no better way to understand how to proceed than to look at the vast panoply of human experience to inform such action. To ignore this, to proceed while ignoring history or paying only cursory attention to it, is to set one up for failure, the same kind of failure in any field, from medicine to engineering, that would follow from merely operating on theory while ignoring large data sets.
with proven results. Roughly 2,000 years ago, one of Rome’s great historians, Titus Livius (known in English generally as Livy), understood this as the primary purpose of history when he wrote in his preface to his epic history of Rome that “[t]he special and salutary benefit of the study of history is to behold evidence of every sort of behavior set forth as on a splendid memorial; from it, you may select for yourself and for your country what to emulate, from it what to avoid, whether basely begun or basely conducted” (From the Founding of the City preface). Ultimately, history and politics are indivisible, and each, by necessity, involves the study, to some degree, of the other. Like Livy, the modern historian John Lewis Gaddis, roughly 2,000 years later, notes the potential for history to inform politics, too, but criticizes the current field of scholars of each discipline for too often ignoring or avoiding the other:

Our fields, therefore, may have more in common than their "narcissism of minor differences" has allowed them to acknowledge. Both disciplines fall squarely within the spectrum of "nonreplicable" sciences. Both trace processes over time. Both employ imagination. Both use counterfactual reasoning. But what about prediction, or at least policy implications? Most historians shy from these priorities like vampires confronted with crosses. Many political scientists embrace them enthusiastically…

… The point… is not so much to predict the future as to prepare for it. Training is not forecasting. What it does do is expand ranges of experience, both directly and vicariously, so that we can increase our skills, our stamina—and, if all goes well, our wisdom. Here too there is, or at least could be, common ground for historians and political scientists: the terrain upon which to train may be more accessible—and hospitable— than at first glance it might appear to be. It deserves, at a minimum, joint exploration.3

In another piece, Gaddis notes that

It would be helpful if policymakers could approach issues of international peace and security from an angle of vision that would take into account both sequence and system—both the approach of the historian and that of the political scientist—and that would relate resulting conclusions to current concerns without falling into the traps of antiquarianism, presentism, and conceptual poverty that have afflicted the historians, or

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the pitfalls of scientific hubris, methodological constipation, and linguistic incomprehension that have encumbered the political scientists…

Therefore, another purpose of this paper is to employ history as Livy and others would use it, and to be a small part of the effort to bridge that gap between history and politics, historians and political scientists, that Gaddis calls upon scholars of those fields to undertake.

b.) On Peace Operations and Motivations

Peace Operations as a discipline should not be confused with Peace Studies. Peace Studies can be broad and apply to large range of topics, Peace Operations, however, is a more specific topic, that may or may not fall into a specific academic program’s definition. No doubt, some programs would oppose the term Peace Operations since any peace operation consists of potentially employing force to work towards peace. Ideologically speaking, some would argue that force cannot be used to bring about “true” peace, or should not; however, the complications of history and practice show that force, short of an ideal world, is unfortunately sometimes necessary to create conditions that allow for the development of peace and justice. I suppose that is why I chose to study Peace Operations here at George Mason University and not Peace Studies somewhere else. The Peace Operations M.S. program here at George Mason is based mainly on the Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO); it and the program define a peace operation “as an intervention into a complex contingency for the purpose of maintaining or restoring peace. The contingency may be due to conflict and/or natural disaster.”

The founder of the Peace Operations program at George Mason University, Dave Davis, defines peace in a peace

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operations sense as containing both civil order and social justice. Any peace operation can be divided into four main higher functions: peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and peace support. Peacemaking “is acting to identify, address, and transcend incompatibilities, and bring contending parties to agreement;” peacebuilding “is acting to create a structure of peaceful, equitable, and interdependent relations between people in, and among, societies;” peacekeeping “is acting to control the security environment in, and around, the territorial space affected by contending parties’ incompatibilities;” and peace support “is acting to provide logistical, administrative, and human support to the overall peace operation.”

As for motivations, one should also understand how important those are to the concept of peace operations. Ultimately, a peace operation should be defined by what it does; the public relations component of an operation may claim all sorts of motives, and propaganda (or better yet: information) is an important aspect of any peace operation, but there can often be a large gap between word and deed. Thus, motivations are crucial. Many wars throughout history have been motivated by dreams of glory, empire, and conquest. Many others are (sometimes also) motivated by fear. Arthur Eckstein rightly shows that many modern interpretations of Rome are unfairly cynical, often letting the views of the historian and his times determine how Rome is viewed, or, as Eric Gruen writes, “[t]he subject of Roman imperialism lends itself too easily to the hazards of hindsight.” Eckstein is not alone, but is perhaps the most emphatic and meticulous in challenging these newer, harsher views of Rome. Yet is he hardly a Roman apologist. “My point,” he writes, “is not to portray the Romans as innocents.” But some basic

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6 Dave Davis, Class Notes MNPS 700, Spring Term 2010.
7 George Mason University, CMPO.
rules of history are ignored in these other presentations of Rome, and Eckstein is able to clearly show the deficiencies in these other presentations while simultaneously discussing other important points missed by these other scholars. Still other scholars point some of these issues out, too, often citing Eckstein. This paper’s focus is not the massive, ongoing debate between historians over the nature and motivations of Roman warfare, expansion, and imperialism. The reader of this paper may feel free to look at the numerous views and scholars on his own.

Andrew Erskine provides a good, brief, summary of various interpretations of Roman imperialism, including Eckstein’s views in the summary.\(^\text{10}\) Eckstein explains that the though Rome was “militarized, bellicose, and diplomatically aggressive,” academics who claim the Romans to be “exceptionally” so, that this was what distinguished Rome from other states and explains its unique success, simply ignore the fact that all large and medium sized states, and many small states, were “militarized, bellicose, and diplomatically aggressive,” too, whether the Classical Greek states, the Hellenistic Greek states contemporary with Rome, the other states and peoples of Italy, and the other states of the Western Mediterranean. If anything, Rome was less brutal, aggressive, and conquest-driven, and more lenient, defensive-minded, and generous than its rivals. All these points are given more attention in section III. The dissenting scholars look at Roman internal characteristics and judge them as aggressive and brutal from modern eyes, while failing to analyze or point out the same characteristics in virtually every other actor on Rome’s world stage, or they conveniently argue away clear evidence these other states were as aggressive and brutal as Rome in order to portray these other states as victims and advance the theory of Rome as an insatiable, cruel imperialist. Where other authors, even some cited in this paper, make determinist or one-sided arguments to make Rome look like an insatiable, world-domination seeking beast, devouring all in its path, Eckstein generally makes the better

\(^{10}\) Andrew Erskine, *Roman Imperialism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 33-49.
argument, with a more holistic analysis that takes additional factors into consideration that other authors fail to include in their analyses. Only Eckstein seems to engage in a systemic, comparative exploration of the culture and environment of all of Rome’s rivals, and conclusively shows that to single Rome out as exceptionally warmongering paints a false picture. In particular, Eckstein shows how comparatively brutal and aggressive many of Rome’s enemies often behaved towards other states, and therefore, how unlikely it is that it was usually simply Rome being the aggressor with everyone else.\textsuperscript{11}

I have relied most heavily on Eckstein in my presentation of the mentality and nature of Rome’s motivations, rise to power, and of the world of the ancient Mediterranean, but the idea of certain Roman operations being able to be viewed as peace operations is my own.

Going back to motivations, if one can see that many operations of Rome’s were not primarily driven by desires for booty or conquest, or for a desire to dominate the world, it helps to explain these operations on a deeper level. Powers concerned with merely expanding their own power in the short term—with just domination, power, money and loot—have tended to act quite similarly; ancient despots and monarchs (and even democratic city-states) would generally take over the land of their defeated their enemies, or maybe kill or enslave them, too; at best, they would be forced into a very unequal alliance, forced to cough up money and troops with very few benefits other than “protection.” All the way through history up into the modern era and Nazi Germany, despite whatever these states claimed, the majority of large, expansionistic states behaved more or less in this way. If a state was conquered, it would simply have a new strong-man installed to rule it, subservient to the new power, or be absorbed into the existing formal structure of the conquering state. The idea that serious governmental reform would occur

\textsuperscript{11}Eckstein., \textit{Anarchy}, 237-243, 37-237.
as an object into itself, that some aspect of social justice would accompany the imposition of order, that the aim would be justice not just for the people of the leader doing the conquering but the conquered as well, that the new power would shy from direct involvement, is exceptionally rare in history. Such motivations are necessary for a real peace operation to occur, otherwise one is generally just exchanging single rulers of the same or perhaps differing levels of brutality. Most other major world historical powers were not concerned with good governance for the conquered, for those living where its armies were operating, for the desires and hopes of the conquered. To a unique degree in the period in question in comparison to its contemporaries, Rome often was concerned with these very things, as this paper will attempt to show. Thomas Burns even writes that “Perhaps…[the Romans’] most concrete objective for a new province was the cessation of warfare.”

While the main object of this paper is the operations, not the context, as explained, the context itself—explaining the motivations—is vital. To many people today, the Romans seem brutal and incredibly expansionistic. Yet, in their world, Rome and the Romans were often regarded as more merciful and just than other states of the ancient Mediterranean during the period in question; furthermore, the Romans, for much of their history, faced constant, brutal, and existential threats that shaped their worldview and foreign policy accordingly, as did most other states at that time.

c.) Commentary on Idealization of Conflict Eras in Ancient Sources

Finally, one must discuss the sources from the ancient world. It is important to understand during what period they wrote and how their own times might have been different

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from the period of the subjects of their writings, since for many surviving ancient sources, their writers are writing some time after the events in question. Events in one’s own time can often shape how one views the past as well as the present, and it is important to recognize this possibility, as well as the motivations of these writers. In fact, this is necessary for examining any source from any period.

Much of any worldview or movement is inevitably the result of or a reaction to a previous set of events or mentalities. The historians and writers of the Late Republic saw their own very deep civil strife and the destructive civil wars and looked back more fondly on the period when “the fear of an enemy” (*metus hostilis*) like Carthage brought about more unity at home. Understandably, trying to emphasize the disunity of their own time, they overemphasized the unity of earlier times in their effort to paint their past as a golden age free from such strife as they experienced. Undeniably, some Romans did seek out war but for various reasons that can sometimes be difficult to determine. Even in the twenty-first century, it is not a simple thing to explain why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. The Iraq episode could offer evidence to an argument that Americans are war-mongering imperialists or to the contrary, depending on what one wishes to highlight or not. Trying to determine motivation in ancient conflict is even more difficult. As one is still discussing human beings, ascribing overly simplistic reasons for man today or two thousand years ago should be avoided. The sources that survive from the Early and Middle Republic are far fewer and more fragmentary than the writings that survive from the Late Republic and early Empire, so there is far less currently extant evidence from the period these later authors idealize. Those authors, accustomed to Rome being the dominant hegemon in the Mediterranean for some time, sometimes seeing Rome as a nation of destiny, seem to forget the real, existential threat that that Hannibal and his Carthaginians or Pyrrhus and his Greeks
actually presented, and the death and devastation they unleashed in Italy. No doubt many a Roman who lived to see Hannibal’s elephants rampaging through Italy would disagree that such threats and such wars were a positive thing and that peace was a negative, destructive thing.\textsuperscript{13}

This is no less true in the United States today. Some political commentators yearn for the “simplicity” of the 1950s, the era of \textit{Leave it to Beaver} and \textit{Father Knows Best}, a time when, apparently, families were stronger, times were simpler, and there was less civil strife. Some of this may be true, but it was the suppressed problems and pressures of the 1950s which exploded into the tumult and chaos of the 1960s and 1970s. African-Americans and many working women are not likely among the chorus calling for a return to 1950s values. Likewise, the messy peacekeeping era of the 1990s and the post 9/11 international state of affairs have led some commentators to long for the “simplicity,” “political unity,” and “sense of purpose” that seemingly characterized the Cold War era. To those who have lived through the American triumph over the Soviet Union, perhaps that triumph seemed inevitable, like the Romans domination of the Mediterranean seemed to some of the Romans, and yet, at several times throughout the half-century the of the Cold War, the world stood on the brink of nuclear annihilation and experienced several near-nuclear-launches that would have left few commentators alive today to “yearn” for such a period. Furthermore, the problems in the developing and postcolonial world that were allowed to fester during the Cold War exploded into the crises of the post-Cold War world, resulting in the deaths of millions, mostly relatively helpless civilians, form Rwanda and the Congo to the Balkans and Gaza. Still, objectively, one must conclude that not living with the very real possibility of massive nuclear war from a rival

\textsuperscript{13} The Republican period of Rome is referred to by three general and chronological parts: the Early, Middle and Late Republic, the Early period covering the founding and beginning of the republic, the Late period the final parts of Republican history before the fall of the Republic.
superpower on a day-to-day basis is better for the success of the human race and for the ability of nations and peoples to live and prosper. A single soviet nuclear weapon (out of thousands) would have virtually destroyed New York City and killed millions; the 9/11 attacks carried out by al-Qaeda killed roughly 3,000 people and destroyed several buildings in comparison. The Soviet Union unquestionable posed a potential existential threat to the U.S. while al-Qaeda has nowhere near such capability. Thus, one must guard against the “grass is always greener” tendency of some humans, whether Roman or American, and also guard against the fact that humans are prone to see what they want to fit a particular view, and to downplay that which does not fit that view. Carlin Barton (discussed in section II) makes important points about Roman notions of peace being different from today’s notions of peace, and correctly understands how the Romans of the Late Republic generally saw the causes of their own strife, but potentially goes too far when she seemingly gives the Late Republican writers too much power in allowing them to speak for the views of earlier generations of Romans. In his translation of Sallust’s *Jurgurthine War*, William Batstone notes that Sallust’s conception of Rome before it finally defeated Carthage totally was “relatively idealistic” and that there is “abundant evidence of strife and conflict” in the period before the Punic Wars with Carthage were over. He also notes in his introduction to his collection of Sallust’s writings that Sallust sought not so much to blame peace as the primary cause of the collapse of the Republic, but, rather, “[f]or Sallust, the failure of political institutions is to a large extent the moral failure of the men who operated within those institutions.” Certainly the case is made that peace allowed conditions for less restraint and greater abuse of power, but ultimately Sallust is more concerned with the moral failures of the ruling class and its leading individuals.\(^\text{14}\)

I.) Introduction: Why Rome?

Accepting the necessity for history to provide the data for most political theory, and for most political theory to be checked against the data history provides, one might still look at the choice of ancient Rome as a case study to inform the modern practice of peace operations with skepticism. “Why Rome? Isn’t Rome so different, and didn’t the Roman Republic and Empire exist so long ago, that there would be little or nothing as far as similarities to the modern U.S.?” The answer is a clear “No, Rome isn’t so different that there aren’t valuable lessons to be learned for modern policy practitioners and theoreticians by a study of it.” In fact, not only is Rome a worthy case study for drawing out lessons applicable to today’s world, it is one of the best.

Tom Holland notes that “Rome was the first—and until recently—the only republic ever to rise to the position of world power, and it is indeed hard to think of an episode of history that holds up a more intriguing mirror to our own.” For proof of this one only needs to look at the many volumes of writings of the American Founding Fathers and the system they created. As M. N. S. Sellers remarks, “[t]he significance of the Roman example at the time of the United States Constitutional Convention can hardly be overstated and it is particularly evident in the works of John Adams, the most often cited and quoted American authority on constitutional government at the time the Constitution was written and ratified.” The American Founding Fathers explicitly used Rome’s constitution as the model from which they based their own, its consuls the basis for the presidency, its Senate the basis for the U.S. Senate, its people’s assemblies the basis for the U.S. House of Representatives, and derived the principle of checks and balances from the Roman model, too. After the Revolution, a young America even saw itself as the reincarnation of Rome’s republic and consciously proclaimed this; Washington, DC’s

architecture is perhaps the most obviously visible aspect of this movement. Rome’s republic lasted nearly five centuries before Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon and the rise of Augustus permanently destroyed the Republic, while so far the U.S. has lasted barely half as long, and there is no guarantee that it will last almost five centuries like Rome. By any fair standard, the U.S. today can only be thought of as the second most successful republic in history, then.15

Manuel Tröster provides an argument that ancient history does provide valuable lessons for today, while cautioning against oversimplified comparisons or selective sampling:

Ancient history and modern thought interact in multifarious ways. While modern concepts can help us to understand, or serve to obscure, ancient reality, the remote past can also be used as a point of reference for contemporary debates about political issues and strategies. In fact, pundits and politicians alike are used to invoking the lessons of (ancient) history in order to justify their recommendations and decisions. This is often done in a most arbitrary and selective way, without regard for the fact that the interpretation of history is too complex a task to yield uncontroversial and straightforward answers to contemporary problems. Nevertheless, it would be rash to dismiss this kind of analysis as unsuitable for academic research; for it should not be overlooked that it can help to broaden the understanding of structural patterns and give a sense of the variety of options available to decision-makers.16

Kurt A. Raaflaub, in his “Series Editor’s Preface” for a series of comparative histories of the ancient world notes that by “enhancing our understanding and appreciation of differences among cultures of various traditions and background,” the series, “[n]ot least,…will…illuminate the continuing relevance of the study of the ancient world in helping us to cope with the problems of our own multicultural world.” In Empires of Trust Thomas Madden emphasizes these traits of Rome and many others to make the case that there are very large similarities between Roman and American culture and history, especially in their use of and skill at maintaining trust, making Rome and America unique; he also notes similarities with Romans’ and Americans’ views of

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themselves, their systems of government, their style of their expansion, and how each was/is viewed by their contemporaries. The U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote a piece praising Madden’s book, too, also noting the relevance for Rome’s example.\(^\text{17}\)

Here are the main reasons Rome was chosen as a model in this paper:

1. As the two most successful republics in history, ancient Rome and the United States have similarities in the structure of their system that other great powers in history—The British Empire, the French Empire, The Mongol Empire, the Russian Empire, China, the Ottoman Empire, the Arab Caliphates—simply do not have. The closest another large power came to a republican form of government with a large (potentially, anyway) degree of popular input, which characterized Rome for most of the Republican period and the United States so far in its history, was the constitutional monarchy of British Empire, once Parliament had asserted itself over the monarchy in 1688; and yet, until after WWI in the twentieth century, the vast majority of even adult British men could not vote in parliamentary elections. Unlike Rome and the U.S., then, British history only recently had to deal with the political desires of the masses, while those desires are central to both Roman and American politics. Only a few decades after seriously expanding the franchise, Britain had pulled out from most of its empire and today does not share the same kinds of responsibilities Rome and the U.S. must deal with as major powers. **Alone among great powers in world history, only Rome and the U.S. have had centuries of experience of a political culture where the government derives its power from the consent of the governed, under systems that overthrew a monarchy and founded a political culture based on individual liberty and rights, where the system operated with wide participation**

in elections of magistrates that exercise/exercised power through a system of checks, balances, and divided powers, magistrates that were/are (in theory, at least) accountable to the people. This means there are similarities that only Rome and U.S. share, from political to cultural to martial, and this makes Rome the obvious choice.\textsuperscript{18}

2.) Secondly, Rome and the United States find themselves in unique situations that only they have ever faced: being the sole superpower at the top of a unipolar world. Some might argue that the world today, and or during Rome’s dominance, was not truly unipolar, but I do not find these arguments convincing. It is hard to argue against the fact that no other world powers had sole dominance the way the U.S. has since the end of the Cold War, at least, not since the Roman Empire. Even when people talk about China as a rising power today, it is generally as an economic superpower, but not as a superpower in any other way. And experts point out constantly that the Chinese economy depends in large part on U.S. demand. Looking back with the benefit of hindsight, one can even see that the Soviet Union during the Cold War was much weaker than Americans realized at the time. Simply put, if America thinks that it often finds itself acting as a so-called “world police,” the Romans were the original “world police.” As Tröster notes,

One of the areas in which historical analogies are looming particularly large is the nature of the current international system and the direction of American foreign

policy. While comparisons are frequently drawn between the United States and various other hegemonic powers of the modern world, most notably the British Empire, ancient Rome is cited no less insistently as a precedent for the supposed unipolarity of the interstate system in the post-Cold War era. 

3.) Thirdly, the Romans even early in their history were a diverse, multicultural lot. According to its founding myths, the brothers Romulus and Remus, the founders of Rome, were descendents of Aeneas, a refugee from the Trojan War who founded a city by the future site of Rome from which Romulus and Remus migrated. The brothers took in many other “shepherds, outcasts, and vagrants” early on, thus becoming a city-state nation of immigrants; it took the wives of the Sabines and united both Romans and Sabines, and then proceeded to unite the diverse people of Italy roughly as much as by assimilation and voluntary union as by conquest. Just as the U.S. grudgingly gave legal rights to former African slaves or Asian immigrants, among other groups that had to wait a long to be formally and informally accorded rights or better treatment, so, too, Rome gradually but surely expanded citizenship and voting rights to include many of its allied communities, eventually including citizenship for many beyond Italy and all those that served in the legions regardless of race, place of origin, or religion. For most of the territories farther away from Italy, localities ran much of their own affairs through local, elected assemblies. Romans were generally tolerant religiously with a few notable exceptions, and also did not seek to impose their culture strongly on conquered people; rather, local cultures could flourish for centuries under Roman rule. What Rome did impose, generally, was law and order: or, going back what the Peace Operations program’s definition of peace is, a sense of civil order and social justice. Thus, Rome and the U.S. are also unique in history for the multicultural and diverse quality of their societies, the degree of participation and rights given to others, even the conquered, and the tolerance and equality espoused by their...
systems. Of course, neither always lived up to this ideal, and surely, Americans would be horrified by many practices of the Romans. Still, relative to other world powers in history, and relative to all other great powers in their own day, the Romans certainly deserve to be compared to Americans for these qualities, for even if the scale of what was considered lenient, forgiving, or tolerant behavior has shifted over many centuries, both Romans and Americans were uniquely lower on the brutality scale for their times than most if not all of their contemporaries. Arthur Eckstein points out that Romans may have had an “intensely militaristic culture,” a “constantly expanding definition of security,” and “increasingly large ambitions,” but so too did all large, all medium, and many small powers of the ancient Mediterranean. Since all Rome’s competitors shared these traits, other factors must explain Rome’s success, and for Eckstein, these were Rome’s “system of inclusion” and “skill at alliance management”—both “ultimately…diplomatic and political skill[s]”—as well as the “the subtle flexibility of Roman identity…[which] allowed for the transformation of the definition of “Roman” by gradually divorcing citizenship at least somewhat from either ethnicity or location, and thus leading to a unique inclusiveness.”

In a similar vein, Nathan Rosenstein points out that the Romans of later generations [after the city’s founding] thought of themselves as a mixed people from the very beginning, drawn from a variety of sources, and imagining their origins in this way undoubtedly helped them accept newcomers into the citizen community on equal terms. This foundation myth stands in sharp contrast to the examples from Greece that emphasize either the conquest of an indigenous population by invaders that served to justify the rule of one group over another in archaic poleis (city-states) or claims of autochthonous origins…

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For Romans, citizenship came to mean “a collection of specific rights and responsibilities that could be conferred entirely or in part on others,” while for the Greeks “citizenship in a poleis stemmed from ethnic identity and membership in an age cohort that had gone through a ritualized process of initiation, a status that was nearly impossible to confer on anyone outside the restricted circle of its members.”

4.) Fourthly and finally, Rome after its defeat of Carthage and the U.S. after the Civil War fought only a few large-scale wars against comparable foreign powers; most of their military conflicts after and a number before were vastly asymmetrical in nature, with Roman and American militaries being clearly technologically superior and better organized (and often, though not always, better-disciplined and better-trained) than a great majority of their opponents, with small units of Romans or Americans often defeating forces much larger than themselves. This means that, like the United States Military today, much of the Roman military’s attention was not in fighting protracted large-scale wars or set-piece battles against large field armies, but in bringing peace to new territories or frontiers, in intervening in the disputes of neighbors that threatened to spill out control and affect Roman interests or commerce, or in fighting small guerilla (terrorist?) bands of non-state or state-sponsored actors. The scholar Adrian Goldsworthy makes sure to note that

…the increased probability that Western armies will fight asymmetric warfare against opponents less sophisticated than themselves, rather than wars against those with similar tactical systems and levels of technology, creates a situation not unlike that faced by Rome. For much of its history the Roman army was better equipped and, even more importantly, far more organized and disciplined than its enemies. In Victorian parlance, many Roman campaigns were “small wars.” Perhaps it is in the way that such operations were conducted…that lessons for the present day should be sought.

22 Rosenstein, 234.
II.) The Concept of Roman Peace

Contrary to popular and Hollywood-style views of Rome, Romans were not all warmongering murderers and many Romans had sophisticated views of peace. Inevitably, any view of peace is tied to views of war; without one, a definition of the other is meaningless. Just as right and wrong, rich and poor are terms that can exist only relative to each other, war and peace will always be related to each other. Today, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) includes “Freedom from civil unrest or disorder; public order and security” as the first definition, and another definition is “Freedom from, absence of, or cessation of war or hostilities; the condition or state of a nation or community in which it is not at war with another; peacetime.” Other definitions include “a state of friendliness; amity, concord” and “quiet.” It notes the origin of the word is from the Latin word pax, also meaning peace. Though the modern Western “notion of peace [is] the child of Roman pax,” it is important to note that there are significant differences between how the Romans conceptualized peace and how the modern world does the same. The Latin word pax, like other important Latin words, has two opposite elements that form the range of the potential use of the word, these two meanings “poised…on the two opposite poles of a balance beam” in a figurative sense, as “[p]ax (peace) for the Romans could be a form of justice or a form of mercy; it might be a type of covenant or it might signal the absence of any contractual relationship.” Thus the same word might give or take, bestow or impose. It can have a “light” or “dark” meaning, yet the “[m]odern English [word “peace”] suppresses the “darker” meaning of Roman pax, or subsumes the “darker” meaning in the “lighter,” so that “the non-contractual aspects have been assimilated into the contractual.” Words like “peace” and “mercy” today only give off a “gentle” vibe. During the final, long period of civil wars that led to the collapse of the Republic and the establishment of the Imperial Roman state, the Roman
definition of peace came much closer to non-threatening, magnanimous, and forgiving meaning it holds for modern audiences, but for much of Roman history there was the aforementioned duality to its meaning. The duality existed, in part, because it took forceful, violent action on the part of Roman officials and armies, and the threat of such action, in order for anything approaching peace to exist. Retribution was a key element in peace and order, and domestic politics as well as international relations was a balancing act between opposing forces in the Roman world. *Pax* could also refer to social contracts; ultimately, much of Roman international relations (and domestic politics) can be seen as a series of social contracts. Finally, one of the common uses of *pax* was in the context of *pax deorum*—peace with the gods—referring to the Romans’ relationship with the divine forces that governed the world.²⁴

For Romans, “war in official ideology was the restoration of order against those who had disrupted that order;” in fact, it was “[t]he Romans [who] were the first to regard war as a form of legal self-help if another state had committed wrong by denial of justice.” It was something the Romans took very seriously, and it was, for much of republican Roman history, a matter of sacred religion. The beginnings of war involved special priests called *fetiales*, which would approach the border of a foreign state that the Romans had felt had done them wrong; they would engage in a ritual called the *rerum repetio*, formally stating Rome’s grievances with the offending party or parties and giving that party or those parties a chance to make amends (even when the system changed as the Republic became larger and envoys were used to declare war instead of priests, the envoys still went through the motions of presenting Roman grievances and giving a chance for atonement of them). This was how the Romans would show the gods and

other nations that that their war, should the enemy not redress the wrongs committed again Rome, was a “just war”—*bellum iustum*—and that the Romans were not the ones disturbing the natural order. In fact, the war would be undertaken to restore the proper order of things. This was markedly different from other cultures of the time, cultures for which aggressive war for its own sake, for territory or plunder or glory, is almost never argued against, cultures which had no official mechanism to restrain their aggressiveness, let alone a sacred, religious one. And for the Romans, *bellum iustum* had to be defensive in nature, or it was not a *bellum iustum*. Cicero emphasized this when he wrote that “…wars are unjust when they are undertaken without proper cause. No war can be waged except for the sake of punishing or repelling an enemy…no war is deemed to be just if it has not been declared and proclaimed, and if redress has not been previously sought…” (*The Republic* 35). He also wrote that”…wars should be undertaken for the one purpose of living peaceably without suffering injustice” (*On Obligations* 1.35). This comment in particular captures the civil order/social justice peace operations conception of a just peace, as in the absence of physical as well as structural violence. Cicero is the best extant articulation of the strain of Roman Stoic principles as applied to government and war and peace; the same principles are amplified by the poet Virgil in *The Aeneid*, articulating belief in Rome’s divine mission to bring civilization and peace to the world (though this is written after the case studies in question, after the Republic has given way to Augustus and the principate, an emperor-system dressed in the trappings of the Republic and honoring its traditions):

“Others, I have no doubt, will forge the bronze to breather with suppler lines, draw from the block of marble features quick with life, plead their cases better, chart with their rods the stars that climb the sky and foretell the times they rise. But you, Roman, remember, rule with all your power the peoples of the earth—these will be your arts: to put your stamp on the works and ways of peace, to spare the defeated, break the proud in war.” (6.980)
The strain of Stoicism in Late Republican conceptions of peace always had undercurrents of universal brotherhood, governed by wise, elected officials in a free society that governed through laws and wisdom which upheld the universal dignity and brotherhood all men shared, and that to go against such principles and treat people unjustly was to violate the basic foundation of society and this universal law, was to violate the gods themselves. Of course, this was the ideal; as in any ideal, practice would differ while still being constrained by the ideal.25

Though “the Romans measured war and peace against a very different yardstick of values than do contemporary Americans or Europeans,” the Roman ideas of war and peace should be regarded as important for students of peace operations, in particular, because “[m]odern notions of ‘justice’ and ‘mercy’ are two keys to understanding ancient Roman notions of peace.”26

At the heart of the concepts of both “peace” and “justice” for Rome was reciprocity. As Barton points out, there was no United Nations or general concept of international law as exists today in the modern world. Eckstein will be heavily cited partly to make the point that the ancient Mediterranean was a fiercely competitive political environment between states; all large states and medium were very aggressive and even many smaller ones, too. Much of this atmosphere comes from centuries of the Greek interstate political culture which dominated much of the Mediterranean. Thucydides, the ancient Greek historian today generally considered to be the founder of the “Realist” school of international relations, writing of his own era used what has become a famous phrase from a dialogue between Athenian and Melian representatives that “right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what

26 Rosenstein, 228; Barton, 245.
they can and the weak suffer what they must” (*History of the Peloponnesian War* 5.89). The issue in question is not loot or glory, but simply survival. In a brutal “militarized interstate anarchy” such as that of the ancient Mediterranean, “fear dominated the decision making of most states.” Even when a state needs to behave defensively, “such defensive actions often take the aggressive form;” it was a world where if one state did not exploit another weaker one, that first state’s rival would exploit that other weaker state and then use its increased power to dominate the first state that hesitated. Even the mere *appearance* of being weak invited trouble and aggression from other states. The “system,” and it probably should not even be granted that sophisticated a word to describe it, “works” whereby any weaker state must be severely punished by the larger state it challenges, for any positive result for the weaker state could encourage other weaker states to follow suit, or even join together against the larger state, or, in a worst case scenario, the stronger state’s own subjects may conclude it is too weak to punish them and may rebel or even seek to overthrow said state. In such an environment, mercy encourages further challenges, so the “system” “works” when the strong state brutalizes and possibly annihilates the smaller state that challenges it, keeping other states in line and following the “rules.” In the case of the Athenians and the Melians, the Melians, after reaching out to allies of Sparta, Athens’ chief rival, did not submit to Athenian rule and were totally destroyed by Athens. Athens may not have even wanted to behave so brutally, but it felt it had no choice under the conditions of “the system.” Thus, the “system” encourages brutality as a necessary means of survival and pushes peoples and states that would prefer mercy to act against such inclinations. It was common for “state expansion…[to be]caused primarily by fear generated by pressing circumstances.”

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III.) **The Context of Roman Peace: Rome’s Difficult and Improbable Rise**

a.) Rome’s Italian Neighborhood

Things were hardly different in ancient Italy than they were in Classical Greece. Ancient Italian cultures were heavily influenced by Greek culture to begin with, and southern Italy came to be dominated Greek city-state colonies. In Rome’s early history, its fellow cities in Latium often presented serious and existential threats to Rome, and even “down to the mid-fourth century Rome was not merely an ordinary city-state in terms of its institutions, but not a very successful city-state in terms of the achievement of even local security.” Not only was it under severe and constant threat from its Latin neighbors, but also from the Etruscan city-states to the north (it was three Etruscans who had become the final three of the seven Kings of Rome and whose line was overthrown by the Romans when they established the Republic). The Etruscans would be a serious and constant existential threat to the Romans down until the early third century B.C.E., though Etruscans would continue to challenge Rome down to the year of Rome’s victory in the First Punic War (264-241) over the Carthaginians in 241. The Etruscans themselves were under heavy pressure from Celtic “barbarian” Gauls in northern Italy, formidable warriors. Starting in 390 B.C.E., these Gauls were a major existential threat to Rome, continued to be so for another two hundred years down to the last years of the third century B.C.E., and were only reduced as a threat through major fighting in the 190s and subsequent Roman colonization. The Italian Gauls began their military interaction with the Romans in the crushing of a Roman army and then the sack and near total destruction of the city of Rome in 390. The Romans were so traumatized by this sack that they built walls “twenty-four feet high and twelve feet thick,” a project which apparently “impoverished” the Roman state. The Romans faced many invasions, some “massive,” from the Gauls and suffered other defeats

29 B.C.E. stands for “before the Common Era,” C.E. the Common Era, a non-religious, non-sectarian alternative to using B.C. and A.D.
from them, too, who even allied with some of the other peoples—Etruscans, Samnites—that the Romans were fighting at the same time. The Gauls also formed a huge part of Hannibal’s armies that ravaged Italy during The Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.E.), and before this had launched a major invasion that initially inflicted severe defeat on the Romans earlier, in 225. Rome’s nearest main rival to the south were the fierce hill-peoples known as the Samnites. After the Capuans submitted to Rome in exchange for help against the Samnites, a half-century of major struggle with the Samnites ensued. These struggles ended, after some serious Samnite invasions of Roman territory and major defeats of Roman armies, in 293 B.C.E., a few years after a major Roman victory over a force that included Gauls, Etruscans, and Samnites. Still, even after they were not an existential threat, the Samnites sided with Pyrrhus and Hannibal, both of whom were. They also were a major instigator in the conflict between Rome and many of Rome’s allies during the Social War (91-87 B.C.E.) in the first century B.C.E more than a century after they rose in support of Hannibal. Tarentum, a city founded mostly by Greek Spartan colonists c. 725 B.C.E., has a history similar to Rome in that it found itself under constant conflict with its neighbors; it too, suffered defeats and invasions, but eventually rose to dominate the southernmost part of Italy. However, this was in part due to its ability to protect the other Greek colonies in the region from the native Italian hill peoples like the Samnites. The Samnites began to give the Tarentines problems at the same time they were giving the Romans problems, and unlike Rome, Tarentum was not able to protect its subordinate allies effectively. When some of them began to go over to Rome for protection at the end of the 280s B.C.E., conflict between Rome and Tarentum began soon after. Tarentum called upon King Pyrrhus of Epirus from mainland Greece to aid them in their fight against the Romans, and under his leadership the Romans were dealt several massive and costly defeats in 280, Pyrrhus’s forces and the
Tarentines advancing to just a two days’ march from the city of Rome. Rome eventually persevered in a long and costly conflict (one which gave rise to the term “Pyrrhic victory”) that lasted until 272, and Tarentum was forced to become a subordinate ally to Rome. Yet the Tarentines defected to Hannibal’s invading armies at the end of the century, encouraging many of the other peoples of southern Italy to do the same, and were only defeated with great effort and difficulty by the Romans in 209, after which they would never rise to challenge Rome again.  

b.) Carthage: Rome’s Greatest Rival

As for Carthage, very little is known about early Carthaginian history. Carthage won a series of fierce naval campaigns against Greek fleets in the latter half of the sixth century B.C.E.,

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30 Eckstein, Anarchy, 120-158. Punic is just another word for Carthaginian, derived from the Latin term for Phoenician; the Phoenecians were the ancestors of the Carthaginians.  
and from 480 to 278, five major campaigns to take the Greek, eastern part of Sicily, especially Syracuse, failed. Syracuse, the leading Greek city-state in eastern Sicily, would also try to take western, Carthaginian part of Sicily, but it, too, failed; its Greek neighboring city-states in Sicily seemed to fear both Carthaginian and Syracusan domination equally. Syracuse even managed to mount an invasion of North Africa and threaten the city of Carthage itself in 310-308. In addition, Carthage suffered from “devastating” offensives against it from Libyans in the 370s; Carthage’s response was to aggressively expand its holdings in North Africa. The Syracusans, under intense pressure from Carthage, brought in Pyrrhus and some of his forces even while he was already fighting the Romans for Tarentum; he nearly pushed the Carthaginians out of Sicily, but they held on and recovered in Sicily. Facing these threats, Carthaginian conduct became even more controlling over its subjects, and more brutal, too, including mass killing of civilians when capturing cities in war. It was in 264 when the rulers of Messana, in northeast Sicily, called upon both Rome and Carthage for protection against Syracuse when Rome and Carthage would come into conflict. Though Carthage was able to garrison Messana and peaceably prevent its destruction and further conflict with Syracuse, Messana “preferred” Roman protection, and then asked Carthage to leave, which it did. But the response by Carthage was to send a significant military force to Sicily and to ally with Syracuse against Messana and Rome. Rome initially focused on Syracuse and after an intense effort, including a siege of Syracuse itself, forced it into submission and to support Rome; thus, Rome quickly became the dominant power in eastern Sicily. Over two decades of struggle then ensued between Rome and Carthage over Sicily; Rome suffered great losses but exhausted Carthaginian resources, and thus secured domination over and major indemnity from Carthage. Much like the fears expressed in Thucydides’s Athenian speakers in the dialogue with the Melians, this peace encourage massive
rebellion at home for Carthage, and a year after the First Punic War ended in 241, Carthage was nearly destroyed by its own mercenaries. Eckstein notes the important and clear reality of this world that even for powerful states, existence was fragile and precarious. Sardinia and Corsica at this time were rebelling against Carthage and the islands, previously part of Carthage’s empire, were outside Carthage’s control; Rome accepted requests of protection from mercenaries on these islands from Carthage and took both islands (yet it would even take Rome years to fully control them). Carthage’s response was to expand into much of Spain over the next two decades. Fearful of Gallic invasions from the north at this point, Rome arranged a treaty with Carthage in the early-to-mid 220s setting the Ebro River as the maximum extent of Carthaginian expansion in Spain; then Carthage attacked a city south of the Ebro—Saguntum—that was, nevertheless, a Roman ally, at least, informally. Saguntum became involved in a conflict with a Carthaginian ally, and despite Roman warnings not to, Hannibal laid siege to it in 219; eight months later, it fell, despite intense (unanswered) appeals from Saguntum to Rome for help, Hannibal killing or enslaving all the surviving Saguntines. Hannibal’s harsh treatment of the Saguntines seems to have deeply moved the Senate, which had not gone past diplomacy to try to end the siege, to act more forcefully, and the senators were ashamed that they had failed their ally so starkly. Neither Rome nor Carthage it seems, had particularly sought out a war with the other, but when confronted with conflicting aims and interests, neither was willing to back down after the fall of Saguntum. Thus, in the words of Eckstein, the Second Punic War “was the result of mutual—and understandable—stubbornness.” Hannibal famously crossed the Alps into Italy in 218, attracting thousands of Gauls to his army. A series of massive defeats were inflicted on the Romans as Hannibal made his way south, the greatest being the defeat at Cannae at 216 (Rome’s greatest defeat before or since, where as many as 50,000 Roman-led troops were killed in one
day). After this crushing defeat, some of Rome’s southern allies defected to Hannibal, including the Samnites and Tarentines; this should clearly underscore how precarious any great state’s position was after a few costly defeats, and why states felt compelled to behave so aggressively, just as the rebellion of Carthage’s mercenaries should, too. Yet, after years of defeats, the Roman outlasted Hannibal in Italy and mounted an invasion of North Africa; there the Romans won and established a new peace with Carthage in 201 that established Rome as the clearly dominant power in the Western Mediterranean—but it had come at enormous cost to Rome.32

**c.) Rome’s Scars**

Today, one knows of Rome’s incredible rise after these struggles, but Romans did not have a crystal ball. For them, they fought many powerful opponents, any of whom could have destroyed them, often more than one of them at the same time, and suffered serious defeats from all these parties, with Rome itself being sacked and mostly destroyed in 390, and the city threatened multiple times after that. For Rome, expansion was the only way to protect one’s self from continual threats at home, as Eckstein explains was the norm for nearly all states. It is notable that many of these parties were able to threaten and occupy Rome’s attention even while fighting wars on multiple fronts, too. Rome was the aggressor only some of the time, and was certainly the target of the expansionism of many rivals in its early history. These rivals were also able to team up with powerful foreign allies (e.g., various mainland Greek kings and generals down to Pyrrhus, and the Carthaginian Hannibal). Threats from their Italian neighbors, whether Italic, Greek, or Celtic in origin, were often only ended after long, bitter struggle and major Roman defeats, when Rome took the fight to the enemy’s lands and established Roman colonies near or among them. That major threats to Italy came from North Africa, Greece, and Gaul

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32 Eckstein., 158-176; Madden, 88-110.
down until the last years of the second century B.C.E., meant for the Romans that security could only be reached by dominating these areas. Massive Germanic armies of the Teutones and the Cimbri had been turned back by Julius Caesar’s uncle, Gaius Marius, at the doorstep of Italy in southern Gaul in 102 and 101, respectively, after previously defeating several major Roman armies and sending Italy into a panic. Thus, one should not look into Roman expansion into Gaul as purely imperialistic, or for glory or greed. Rome had faced very real threats coming from Gaul into Italy, from the Gauls themselves to Hannibal and the Carthaginians to the Cimbri and Tuatones. Men were alive in Caesar’s day who had fought—and been defeated by—the last wave of Germanic invaders. For Rome, Gaul had been an invasion route used by enemies to inflict massive devastation on Rome, and this had nearly occurred again in living memory when Caesar campaigned there in the middle of the first century B.C.E. Likewise, threats had emerged from Greece, from Pyrrhus, who had come close to taking Rome and who inflicted massive death and destruction on Rome a generation before Hannibal. It is in this context that Rome would see its first main operations in mainland Greece and later the wider Eastern Mediterranean, what were some of the largest, and first, peace operations-style actions by any major state in history. Now that the context of the ancient Mediterranean and a proper understanding of Rome’s mentality and motivations have all been discussed, it is these operations, with which this paper is primarily concerned, which will now be discussed.
As the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.E.) was drawing to a close, Rome received embassies from several Greek states—Ptolemaic Egypt, Pergamum, Rhodes, Athens, and “probably” the Aetolian League—in 201-200 B.C.E., urging Roman intervention on their behalf against Macedon and the Seleucid Empire. For some time a balance-of-power conflict between the three main successor states to Alexander the Great’s brief empire had played out between the Ptolemaic regime based in Egypt, the Seleucid Empire, at this time based in Antioch in what is now Syria, and the Antigonid regime of Macedon, based north of Greece. But the Ptolemaic regime in Egypt became very destabilized and severely weakened, and Philip V of Macedon and Antiochus III of the Seleucid Empire began to clearly covet carving apart Ptolemaic Egypt and its empire. Not only was Egypt itself was asking for help, but the other three to four states were fearful of greatly enlarged Macedonian and Seleucid states overwhelming all of them and totally

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dominating the eastern Mediterranean. Like many of the independent states of the western Mediterranean, these states would rather put themselves voluntarily under obligation to Rome than other powers, in this case the other two of Alexander’s successor states. Eckstein notes “that it is instructive how often the least threatening choice seemed to be Rome during this period,” and certainly one reason for this was the Roman “reputation for relatively mild treatment of allies.” This was “equally important” to their ability to be powerful enough to offer protection.” Such concepts form the entire basis for Madden’s *Empires of Trust* and the basis for much of his likening of ancient Rome to the modern United States.34

Eckstein takes great effort to point out that Polybius, Greek by blood and birthplace and a contemporary or near contemporary of the events in question, emphasized the pressures of the anarchic system as a major cause for the Roman intervention in the Greek East. For Polybius, 217 specifically is the year where the western and eastern Mediterranean ceased to be separate geopolitical entities (*The Histories* 5.105). Previously, most of the time states could act in the east or the west of the Mediterranean and the actions of states in the other region would not usually greatly impact those in the other. Before this, Rome had intervened only twice across the Adriatic, and this to deal with Illyrian (i.e., Balkan/Northeastern Adriatic) pirates who had been wreaking havoc upon Italian shipping. After each intervention, Rome totally withdrew from Illyria feeling it had both ended the threat of major piracy emanating from there and protected Italian shipping. But when Philip V of Macedon sought to exploit Roman weakness—and seemingly near-defeat—at the height of Hannibal’s invasion of Italy by allying with Carthage and by seeking to undo the results of Rome’s previous interventions in Illyria by establishing Macedonian domination there, this began a process and series of events that would merge the

34 Eckstein, *Anarchy*, 79-116, 179, 155; Madden, *passim*.
Mediterranean into a single political entity. The Romans feared yet another invasion from an ambitious Greek leader, but the alliance between Philip and Hannibal did not lead to any serious Greek-Roman clashes, as Rome had to focus on the Carthaginian threat. By treaty with its Greek allies, Rome also made it clear it did not seek any territorial annexations across the Adriatic from Italy. Rome was mainly in a supporting role as Philip took on Rome’s allies and friends in Illyria, the Balkan Adriatic coast, and mainland Greece from 214-205, but the war would not last long past one of the major actors on the Roman side, an exhausted Aetolian League hoping for more help from Rome that did not arrive, coming to terms with Philip. The final peace ending what is now referred to as the “First Macedonian War” left Philip with some gains but had also kept him out of the coastal area across from Italy’s boot heel. More importantly, Rome was now thoroughly exposed to Greek politics, and had established some serious ties across the Adriatic.\(^{35}\)

It was during this very minor conflict with Philip when Hannibal was rampaging through Italy and threatening the survival of the Roman state. Hannibal seemed a distant threat in 219 but less than one year later he, his armies, and his elephants were devastating Italy. More than a generation earlier, Pyrrhus’s intervention from some distance was an exception, but after the experience of Hannibal, Rome would be forced to consider hostility and conflicts of interest emanating from outside of Italy more urgently and more frequently; preemption would be preferable to inaction and an enemy army at the gates of Rome.

So when the various Greek embassies arrived at Rome in 201-200, Philip was hardly off the Roman radar, and yet, so soon after the long, terrible conflict with Hannibal, Rome was not eager for a major war, especially one with another serious power. To illustrate the scale of

devastation the fighting had brought upon Rome, Eckstein shows Roman census figures that give Rome 380,000 male citizens close to the beginning of the first Punic War, in 263; by 209, with Hannibal in Italy, it had fallen to merely 137,000, while in 201, at the end of the Second Punic War, that number had only recovered to 219,000; as Eckstein notes, “[t]he precise numbers cannot be trusted, but the trend is clear.” The embassies convinced the Roman senators that an apparent alliance had been reached between Antiochus and Philip to take down Ptolemaic regime, that the whole of the Mediterranean would fall before their combined power without Roman assistance, and that before long, Rome itself would be threatened by greatly enlarged and vastly more powerful Macedonian and Seleucid states, encompassing most of Greece and Ptolemaic Egypt’s empire, including Egypt itself. The reaction of the senators was a sea change in their perception of the situation. For one thing, both Philip and Antiochus had already begun to aggressively assault Ptolemaic territories, and had been expanding their power in other ways, as well; these were the two most feared and aggressive rulers in the East at the time, whose behavior seemed to indicate limitless ambition. Antiochus by this time was already calling himself “Antiochus the Great,” consciously modeling himself after Alexander the Great and seeing himself as the heir to Alexander’s “world” empire; Philip was hardly unambitious himself, and may have harbored similar dreams. Two major battles between the Ptolemies and Antiochus had involved as many as 150,000 and 120,000 combatants between them in 217 and 200, respectively. Rome was not then fielding armies anywhere near that combined strength, and even Rome’s largest army in recent memory would only have been roughly one-half the size of such a large threat, so should either Philip or Antiochus have been able to add Ptolemaic Egypt’s military resources to its own, the consequences could have been devastating for Rome. The senators, having paid the price of being cautious while Saguntum was under Hannibal’s
siegé and remaining uninvolved in Spain directly before the start of the Second Punic War, saw the very aggressive and expansionist behavior of both kings (but especially Philip, much closer to Rome) as alarming. The persuasive Greek embassies, bringing the apparent alliance between Philip and Antiochus to the Romans’ attention and the fact that such men might very well turn to Rome as a near-future target, brought the senate to a position of accepting the calls for intervention. The senate endorsed putting diplomatic pressure on Antiochus and giving Philip a choice: stop his attacks against the Greeks, or war with Rome. However, Rome was a republic, and even the senate was divided on this; the people had the final say on war and peace in a sort of referendum, and, tired of long, costly wars, did not think either Philip or Antiochus to be a major threat. They rejected the call for conditional war against Philip emphatically. When the voting assembly of the people was reconvened, the consul (one of the two annually-elected heads of state and leaders of Rome) Publius Sulpicius Galba then spoke to them, beginning by saying “Citizens, I do not think you realize that what you are debating is not whether to have war or peace. Philip, who is mounting a vast land and sea offensive, is not going to make that an option for you to take or leave. The question is whether you are to transport your legions to Macedonia, or else admit your enemy into Italy.” (From the Founding of the City 31.7) He continued at some length, noting that the experience of the recent war with Carthage—especially failing to come to Saguntum’s aid—that was fresh on all their minds, and that Philip in Greece was far closer than Hannibal had been in Spain. He also invoked the experience of Pyrrhus from more than a generation earlier, noting how Philip was dramatically more powerful than Pyrrhus, while Rome, having just finished the devastating war with Carthage, was weaker than it had been when if confronted Pyrrhus. This comes from Livy, and while Livy often invents historical speeches, this is normally from much earlier historical periods; Livy would have had access to much more
archival material concerning this period and there is a good case that there is historical truth in this speech he provides as the consul’s. What should be clear from the circumstances even without the speech is that fear and security, not conquest or riches, are main concerns here. Pressure from some senators with Galba’s apparent speech swayed the assembly to vote in support of taking conditional action against Philip.\footnote{Eckstein, \textit{Anarchy}, 110-111, 257-288, 263n61 quoting Livy for Roman citizen population figures; Goldsworthy, \textit{Carthage}, 317-319; Erskine, 24-25; Gruen 2004, 249; Gargola, 158; Madden, 124.}

Firstly, Rome’s envoys built up its network of allies among the Greek states, then found Philip in the summer of 200 while he was besieging an important city on the Asian side of the Dardanelles, who rejected the Roman demands. After delays that were likely a result of both serious religious and recruitment issues, Rome finally dispatched the consul Galba with a sizable army that fall across the Adriatic. Skirmishes and small battles would characterize 199 and 198 as Rome tried to invade Macedonia twice but did not break through, yet in 197, a new consul, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, smashed Philip’s army decisively in a major battle at Cynoscephalae. The ensuing peace terms must surely be one of the most remarkable peace arrangements in all of the ancient world. Terms for Macedon—that Philip withdraw from and stay out of Greek cities on both sides of the Aegean, pay an indemnity, reduce the size of his navy, become an ally of Rome, accept that “Rome now directed…[Macedon’s] foreign policy, arbitrated in disputes between Philip and the Greek cities,” and accept a smaller Macedon—were generous relative to how contemporary states treated enemies defeated in war. And when the following statement announcing part of the terms was read in the summer of 196 at a major Greek sporting event, “The Senate of Rome and Titus Quinctius Flamininus the proconsul, having defeated King Philip and the Macedonians in battle, leave the following states and cities free, without garrisons, subject to no tributes, and in full enjoyment of their ancestral laws [he
then named the a large number of Greek states]” (Polybius 18.46; see Livy From the Founding of the City 33.32 for virtually the same speech), the many Greeks gathered for the athletic competition erupted into euphoric, frenzied joy. Asian Greeks would also be free from Macedonian domination, and though some areas would be given to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues, most liberated areas would receive full independence. Still, words were words; would Rome really pass up the opportunity to control all Greece? Such speeches had been given by other tyrants in the past, and more than a few Greeks were nervous that the Romans would simply replace the Macedonians. In this case, yes: all Greek cities south of Mount Olympus were set free from Macedonian control, and after two years of mediating disputes between various Greek states, Flamininus, all his troops, and all Roman officials went back to Rome by the summer of 194. To be sure, Rome did have a new level of influence in Greek affairs, but true to their word, the Romans left the Greeks to handle their own domestic affairs, if not leaving them free to wage relentless warfare. Livy writes shortly after his account of the proclamation that

There was, then, a nation on earth that waged war for the freedom of others, at its own expense and itself facing the hardship and danger; and it did this not for its neighbors or for people geographically close or on the same land mass, but actually crossed seas to prevent an unjust empire existing anywhere in the world and to assure the primacy of rectitude, divine justice, and the law of man. With a single announcement, all the cities of Greece and Asia [i.e., Asia Minor] had been set free; only an intrepid soul could formulate such an ambitious project, only phenomenal valour and fortune bring it to fruition. (33.33)

To be sure, on some levels this is Roman propaganda. As already explained, Rome had very real security interests, and new friends from the previous conflicts, in the region. At the same time, there is very likely truth to what Livy said; this is certainly how many Romans viewed their involvement. Madden finds much validity in this perspective. He explains that during this period there was much admiration for Greek civilization and culture among Rome’s elites, and
that, furthermore, as a republic which had thrown out kings centuries earlier, which cherished its political freedom and that placed its sovereignty in the “Senate and People of Rome” [SPQR in Latin, the emblem of Rome for generations], the Romans genuinely felt proud to help their “cultural parents” achieve their freedom. He likens the situation to American attitudes towards helping Europe in WWI, WWII, and the Cold War.37

Unfortunately, the peace would not last. Rome had stepped into a world of limitless micro, macro, and everything-in-between-levels of ambition and fierce conflict, with enmities that went back centuries, when it stepped into mainland Greece. Antiochus, meanwhile, had been approached by Roman envoys the fall of 200, either just before or just after he had the wrested the lower half of the eastern Mediterranean coast –down to near Sinai— from the Ptolemies. Having just crushed a Ptolemaic army, there was little to keep him from marching into Egypt and Alexandria; Eckstein sees his decision to not proceed into Egypt after these successes as a possible result of the Roman diplomatic pressure. Still, Antiochus continued expansion in other areas, taking Sidon and parts of Asia Minor, while Rome was battling Philip. By the time that Flamininus’s peace is announced, Antiochus had declared his intent to annex all of Asia Minor. Eventually, he would even expand over the Hellespont in the Gallipoli peninsula and in parts of Thrace, into Europe, and not far from mainland Greece. Antiochus refused repeated Roman demands to stay out of Europe, and preserve the freedom of the allies of Rome and cities previously held by Philip in Asia Minor. He even sent an army to take over Egypt when a rumor said that his rival Ptolemy V had died, but turned it back when that rumor proved to be false. Antiochus kept expanding into European soil with a large army in Thrace, and Hannibal of Carthage was even one of his military advisors. A debate in the Senate around this

37 Eckstein, Anarchy, 289-292; Erskine, 25-26; Goldsworthy Carthage, 320; Gruen 2004, 249-250; Gargola, 158; Madden, 128-132.
time emerges, with Flamininus maintaining that the best way to keep the peace in Greece and keep Antiochus out was to keep their word and withdraw, while Scipio Africanus, who defeated Hannibal in Africa, and others argued for keeping troops in Greece, but, as has been stated, the troops were withdrawn; Flamininus’s argument would win the day. Despite continued diplomatic discussions, Antiochus refused to back down, and Rome refused to betray the Greeks whose freedom it had guaranteed. Ironically, it was Rome’s ally going back to the First Macedonian War that now breaks the peace. The Aetolian League of Greek cities felt cheated by the peace settlement, felt that they deserved more gains from the settlement, the Achaeans less, and that Rome was too generous to their old enemy, the Macedonians. Seeing an opportunity, in the summer of 192 the Aetolians formed an alliance with Antiochus, under which they hoped to dominate Greece. They began expanding their League both through alliance and conquest, against the terms of the Roman peace settlement. They also assassinated the King of Sparta, hoping to take it over, but this prompted the Achaean League, a rival of the Aetolians, to take Sparta over and bring it into their league. These events occurred despite strenuous Roman protest, yet all through the summer, that is all Rome did: protest. The Aetolians also called on Antiochus to settle any “dispute” between them and Rome; when Flamininus mentioned to the Aetolians, on a diplomatic mission, that they should take up their grievances with the Roman Senate, the Aetolian leader apparently retorted that in just a short while, he would dictate terms to the Romans from a military camp on the banks of the Tiber River, just outside of the city of Rome itself. After multiple requests by the Aetolians to intervene, Antiochus landed in Greece in the winter 192; the Aetolians elected him their military leader for 192/191, and a number of Greek states join this new alliance. Shortly before Antiochus landed in Greece, a small Roman force was sent to the part of Greece just over the sea from Italy’s boot as a preventive measure;
then, roughly as Philip landed in Greece, Rome declared war on Antiochus and the Aetolians. The Romans had not known that Antiochus had even landed in the east of Greece, and Antiochus had not known that the Romans had sent troops to the west coast of Greece. If each had been aware of the actions of the other, perhaps each would have behaved differently, but war is what ensued. The first half of spring 191 saw Rome take many defensive measures, the Romans fearing an invasion, perhaps even with Hannibal in the lead. The Romans then landed a large force in Greece, and after success against both the Seleucids and Aetolians, crossed into Asia. There, in 190, Scipio Africanus’s younger brother dealt Antiochus a crushing defeat at Magnesia.38

A new peace settlement was reached in 188, keeping Antiochus out of Asia Minor. He had to stay to the east of the Taurus Mountains (where the Mediterranean coast turns south to Syria), pay a huge indemnity, severely reduce his navy, and let Rome rewarded its main allies with his ceded territory. Macedon had even stayed true to its treaty, and helped Rome during the war, but was forced to give up most of its gains against the Seleucids after these very gains asked Rome to be freed. Rome, having dealt the only other potent power in the Mediterranean a mighty blow and pushed it much further away from Rome, in many ways stood supreme, for “the victorious Romans…now dictated the new interstate structure, and were its leaders and formidable patrons.” Having said that, all Roman military forces in Greece and Asia were withdrawn (again!) to Italy in 188, and during this whole era, “the Senate, at least in form, acted as a leader, protector, and arbiter, rather than as a ruler.” In fact, Rome had consistently displayed a reluctance to become permanently involved in—or be responsible for—the Greek world. Ptolemaic Egypt had survived, while Pergamum and Rhodes picked up new territory at

38 Eckstein 290, 292-305; Gruen 2004, 250-251; Goldsworthy, Carthage, 319-320; Gargola, 158-159; Erskine, 26-27; Madden, 133-135.
Antiochus’s expense; the Achaean League was given a free hand in the Peloponnese (i.e., Greece’s large southern peninsula linked to the rest of mainland Greece near Corinth), while the activities of the Aetolian League now had to be approved by Rome. The peace lasted for some time, but Philip did what he could to rebuild his power, and his son, Perseus, continued to do so when he succeeded him in 179. As Perseus became more aggressive, agitated Greek envoys were sent to Rome warning the senate of his actions. Yet for years, Rome did not view him as a major threat to the stability of the region; his wars were with Thracians to the north, not with the Greeks to his south. Rome preferred to stay out of those local conflicts at first. And to the south, Perseus increased his power not through war but diplomacy. Still, this made Roman allies increasingly uncomfortable, and after 172 Rome began to intervene, but only diplomatically. Neither Rome nor Perseus seemed eager for war, both engaging in feverish diplomacy to build support, with some of Rome’s allies required some serious prodding, seeming to not understand that though Rome did not formally impose requirements on them, informally Rome did expect cooperation. The fiercely independent Greeks realized they owed their freedom to Rome, and this did generate some resentment. The Romans even made some changes to the Greek political map, but diplomacy ultimately failed, giving way to the Third Macedonian War (172-167). It had been seventeen years before a Roman army had appeared in Greece, and it only took one major battle, fought at Pydna in 168, to crush Perseus and those who had gone over to him.39

This peace settlement would be more than a little different than the previous settlements. The Macedonian monarchy was abolished by Rome, Macedon turned into four separate republics instead, with royal mines and royal land confiscated by the Roman state—the first time Rome

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took formal possession of anything in the region. Half of these new Macedonian republics’ taxes would be sent to Rome. Greeks that had either sided with Perseus or not done enough to help Rome were punished harshly: many of the major Greek states and cities, especially the Achaean League, but also the Aetolian League and a number of other cities, had to send to Rome very important members of the ruling class as hostages (Polybius was among this wave of hostages). The Aetolians also lost territory. Opposition leaders in these Greek states used Roman anger to get the leaders who had displeased Rome removed from power and used Roman backing to take over. The Epirus region—right across from the boot heel of Rome—received the harshest punishment: seventy towns were destroyed by Roman forces, and apparently 150,000 people sold into slavery (for a single event, a singularly unique occurrence in Roman republican history). Rhodes and Pergamum were given a diplomatic cold shoulder; Rhodes, in particular, suffered from this as some its cities under its control rebelled as a result of the loss of Roman patronage for Rhodes, and Rome declared one of the major Rhodian-controlled ports a free city. As harsh as Rome was towards the troublesome Greeks, it still allowed all of them freedom and self-governance, including the Greeks that had allied with Perseus, and even the Macedonians, though split into separate states, also enjoyed self-governance. Apart from the mass enslavement and destruction in Epirus, such punishment was, if anything, to be expected after such behavior, but even allowing for this, Rome still continued its hands-off policy in Greece and withdrew all its forces back across the Adriatic (Again!!). Meanwhile, before the war was even concluded, a Roman envoy visited the new Seleucid king, Antiochus IV, who was taking advantage of the conflict in between Macedon and Rome by invading Egypt. The envoy insisted that Antiochus halt his invasion of Egypt, and when Antiochus asked for time to consider, the envoy drew a circle in the sand around Antiochus and told him to have his answer before he stepped out of
what would become the proverbial “line in the sand;” Antiochus gave in and withdrew. Rome also mediated an ensuing Ptolemaic civil war and a succession crisis in the Seleucid Empire.  

Still, there were divergences between Rome and the Geeks that needed resolution:

…there had been some confusion among the Greeks as to the precise definition of “freedom.” When the Romans claimed to be guaranteeing it, what did this mean? One could never be sure with barbarians, of course: their grasp of semantics was so woefully inadequate. All the same, it did not require a philosopher to point out that words might be slippery and dangerously dependent on perspective. And so it had proved. Roman and Greek interpretations of the word had indeed diverged. To the Romans, who tended to regard the Greeks as fractious children in need of the firm hand of a pater familias, “freedom” had meant an opportunity for the city states to follow rules laid down by Roman commissioners. To the Greeks, it had meant the chance to fight each other.  

Still, after Pydna, the Greeks of Greece and Asia essentially carried on their own affairs and acted quite independently, though without waging war. Pergamum prospered and grew in


\[\text{41} \quad \text{Potter, The expansion of Roman power in the second century BC, }\]


\[\text{42} \quad \text{Holland, 35.}\]
power, later becoming an ally again of Rome down the road, while Rhodes, too, recovered and also eventually regained Roman favor. Yet in the rest of the Mediterranean, neither the Seleucid nor the Ptolemaic Empires behaved as if they answered to Rome on most issues. Peace in Greece and Asia lasted for eighteen years, but suddenly, in 150, a man called Andiscus who said he was the son of Perseus emerged to take control of most of Macedonia and reestablish a unified monarchy; he apparently won a number of hearts and minds in the region, yet after initially defeating a small Roman force, the Romans sent a serious-sized army and crushed him in 148. Rome would send high-level elected senatorial officials and maintain troops there on a regular basis from this point forward. To the south, events developed in a confused and unclear manner; even today, interpretations differ widely on the forces behind the following events. Rome tried to mediate a dispute between the Achaean League and Sparta, with the League trying to force Sparta back into fold. Tensions between the League and Rome may have been increasing, and Sparta called on Rome for help. Rome advised that the League give Sparta—and several other cities—independence, but the League dismissed the advice of the Roman Senate, and continued to attack Sparta. The Roman requests to release several cities besides Sparta from the League may have been more designed to intimidate the League rather than have been an expression of serious Roman aims. The Roman ambassadorial delegation was rudely treated in Corinth, part of the League, and claimed to have barely escaped with their lives, though this may have been an exaggeration for propaganda purposes. Yet a subsequent envoy conveyed milder demands, and another later delegation asked the League to hold back from attacking Sparta again; they were booed and treated disrespectfully. There is missing information regarding the precise timing and nature of decisions just before war erupted, but this much is clear: after repeated rejection of Roman mediation and rude—allegedly violent—treatment of Roman
envoys, Rome had had enough and “its patience snapped.” Elements of the army that had just defeated Perseus swing south; the Achaeans, their Army on route to first punish rebellious cities in the League and then later to force Sparta back into the League, fled at first but ultimately refused to back down in light of the Roman advance, and after defeating the Achaean army, the Roman force destroyed Corinth in 146. The fury of Rome was unleashed: Corinth’s great buildings were destroyed, its people who had not fled apparently slaughtered and enslaved, its treasures looted, its land confiscated by the Roman state. This was the same year that Rome utterly destroyed the city of Carthage in a similar manner. Rome was becoming less tolerant of its arrangements being ignored or challenged; the Achaean League was (temporarily) dissolved. Before 146, the Greeks clearly acted as if they thought they owed Rome no obedience, but Roman actions in 146 successfully put an end to this behavior.43

Warfare between Greek polities, and between the Greeks and Macedonians, in mainland Greece ceased. The mainland Greeks would not challenge Roman rule again, except nearly sixty years later from 88-86 B.C.E., when the Athenians, inspired by Mithridates’s takeover of Roman Asia, invited Mithridates to liberate them against Roman rule. By 86, the Roman General Sulla pushed Mithridates out of Asia and sacked Athens as punishment, but did not destroy it. Roman armies would fight each other in Greece in the ensuing decades, but apart from these isolated incidents, Greece would have peace for centuries, until Late Antiquity. Even after the destruction of Corinth in 146, it would be some time before direct Roman rule would be established in Greece. Territorial “empire,” with clear boundaries and direct Roman administration, was not something that existed in the Roman mind at this point. Provinciae

referred not to administrative regions with consistently defined boundaries at this time, but areas of special responsibility and, specifically, military command. A *provincia* was where the Senate determined that war should be waged, or where Roman military forces should be deployed in defensive, deterrent, or policing activity (Rome had no police). Governance in all Roman “provinces” throughout most of the third and second centuries B.C.E. remained in the hands of locals, as a “province,” was not a governmental administrative unit, just an area of military responsibility. “Empire” was not the same concept in modern English as it was in Latin for most of the Roman Republic; what the Romans were after was power and influence, at first mostly as a means to the end of security, and the Roman word *imperium* referred to the power to command awarded for specific *provincae* of responsibility. Little changed from the Roman perspective from 196-146; from the beginning the Romans expected the Greeks to conduct their own local affairs in freedom free of self-initiated warfare against their neighbors, while Rome would expect deference on major issues of war and peace and foreign affairs. The level of deference expected increased over time, and when the Greeks did not get the message, the Romans made it brutally clear who was in charge. After spilling so much Roman blood and expending such large resources in Greece, Rome eliminated all doubt as to their expectations—and what the Roman response would be to enforce its expectations if they were not met—in 146. Still, Greeks were free to govern themselves, without meddling from their neighbors or direct Roman interference in local, day-to-day affairs for a long time to come, and “*imperium* continued to mean the display of authority, not the imposition of governance.”\(^{44}\)

Rome tried repeatedly to create a framework whereby the main city-states of the Greeks, on both sides of the Aegean, could live in peace and security, free not only from outside threats and Macedon, but from aggression from each other. After three wars, Rome still made the decision to withdraw its forces and let the Greeks run their own affairs under Roman protection; Macedon was only severely punished after the third war against it, and it only received a permanent Roman presence and delegation as what would become a permanent “province” after the fourth war; this was generous and patient by any contemporary standard. Apart from the sack of Corinth and the slaving and destruction in Epirus, Roman behavior was at worst no worse than other contemporary powers, and at best very generous in this period, though this would change over time. One thing is virtually certain: without Roman hegemony as it was established throughout the first half of the second century B.C.E., mainland Greece would have been wracked by the non-stop inter-Greek warfare it had always been subject to since recorded history, in addition to aggression from the Macedonian and Seleucid states. The ultimate reason that Rome brought its wrath down upon Corinth was not so much that Rome wanted to take over Greece as much as it was that different Greek states were adamant about maintaining their ability to make war on their neighbors, including their Greek neighbors, something Rome eventually made clear it would not tolerate. Thus, on the one level, Rome’s policies were a failure in that it tried to be generous but was repeatedly forced back into war in order to prevent Greek states from making war upon each other. And yet, in the long run, this is exactly what Rome succeeded in accomplishing, despite some brutal measures taken. Rome did succeed in bringing a general state of peace to Greece, albeit at a heavy cost to Romans, Greeks, and Macedonians; yet responsibility for this is shared among all these groups and some others, too, and the cost of non-intervention could very well have been even higher. The Greeks and Macedonians did not
give Rome much choice, but ultimately it was Roman intervention that would be the event in Greek history that led to long-term peace, not merely security but actual peace. And unlike Rome, it is likely any other contemporary power would have been more brutal and allowed far less freedom, given the evidence available.

V.) Lucullus in the East

It was in this context that the last King of Pergamum, Attalus III, left his entire realm, a significant part of western Asia Minor, to Rome in his will in 133 when he died. The entire Mediterranean, including Rome, was stunned at such an unprecedented move. “The Romans, notably, showed little eagerness to take up the legacy,” as the situation seemed unstable; one man emerged claiming he was a member of the royal line and that the realm was his, and local conflict ensued. Rome did not even send a commission to investigate the claim and the situation until 132, and it was not until 131 that any Roman military forces arrived, sent more out of a concern for the destabilizing situation that was emerging there, which threatened to devolve further into a free-for-all among Pergamum’s neighbors who wanted to carve up the wealthy former kingdom. It took until 129 for Rome to bring security and stability to the area, and Rome actually gave most of the cities and land that were under the control of Pergamum in 133 over to its allies in the area or simply gave the individual cities their independence, although bribery was alleged to be part of this process. It should be pointed out that these are hardly the actions of a rapacious imperial power bent on limitless conquest and expansion. When the new Roman “province” (provincia) of Asia (the general region was also known as Asia) was established, it encompassed just the western part of the former kingdom. The responsibilities of the provincia were to “police the area,” and it is not even certain how many towns, regions and cities were taxed at this point. The Romans engaged in a massive road building project in Asia, and a major
highway—the Via Egnatia—had been completed by this time, linking the Bosphorus through Macedonia to the Adriatic. Systemized mass tax collection, or tax-farming, by Roman publicani—the Roman equivalent of modern multinational corporations—did not start until 122, and “no sign of excessive exploitation surfaces for another twenty years after that.”

The gift of Attalus immediately became embroiled in the largest domestic political turmoil in Rome since the early days of the Republic. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, a tribune of the plebs—the office which traditionally looked out for the interests of the lower classes, and had unique powers—was trying to pass a much needed land-reform bill that would have limited the amount of land wealthy landowners could own; small landowners were disappearing and desperately needed access to land. The senators, themselves being the wealthy landowners, put their own interests ahead of the state and opposed the legislation. In the controversial maneuvering which ensued, the bill was passed but the senate refused to fund implementation of it. Gracchus proposed using revenue from what would be this new Roman territory to fund his land commission, a breach of etiquette (one among several on both sides of the issue) since the senate traditionally handled finances and foreign affairs. However, Gracchus was murdered by a group of senators, ending work on the issue. His younger brother, Gaius, took up the mantle of reform as tribune for 123 and 122, and part of Gaius’s strategy was to gain the support of diverse aspects of Roman society. One of these groups were the equites—knights—of Rome and Italy; these men were the merchant middle-class, many of whom ran large, often multinational, government-contractor corporations called publicani. Sneered at by the Roman senators, who were forbidden by law be part of or lead publicani (just as those who were in publicani could not be senators), the equites running the publicani were eager to do business in Asia. Gaius saw to it

45 Gruen 2004, 261; Erskine, 28-29; Holland, 36-37; Kallet-Marx, 97-122.
that *equites* were parts—the dominant parts—of jury and judge pools in general and wholly replaced senators for the jury pool of a new permanent extortion court for Rome’s provincial officials, as the senators had been rare to convict their own. At the same time, the state contracts for tax collection in Rome’s new *provincia* of Asia (which would become more of a directly ruled province in the more modern sense of the world as the second century B.C.E. ended and the first began) were brought to Rome, where the *publicani* could bid to take on the contracts in return for a percentage of the money coming in; a single contract would be awarded for the whole province in the case of Asia. Before, there had been district-level local contractors in the province, which allowed for a lot of abuse by Roman governors. But the unintended consequence of Gaius’s reforms was an exponential level of growth in wealth and power for the *publicani*; Rome’s new province was immensely wealthy. For his efforts, among others, the senators tried to kill Gracchus, who had his own slave kill him when he was cornered. Yet these laws of his would have far reaching consequences. Just as Rome had become more assertive of its power by 146, so by the end of the century it had become increasingly more corrupt and less restrained; Rome’s engagement with its newfound—and evolving—*provincae* would begin to increasingly reflect this as the first century wore on. By the end of the century, abuses of the *publicani*, largely given a free hand in the provinces, were a major, growing problem in Asia and elsewhere; more and more, governors and *publicani* would work secretly, hand-in-hand, to fleece the provinces and the provincials for as much money as possible. *Equites* were generally a major part of the juries and the senators and *equites* had become ever closer as allies as their interests converged. This convergence was in no small part because both classes became more corrupt as more money was being made. The governed began to see senatorial governors and the *publicani* as one in the same. As such, the extortion courts could not be, and were not to be, honest judges
of corruption. In fact, they would even be ironically used against people who tried to reign in corruption and the publicani. The abuses of the system were so bad by 70 B.C.E. that Cicero could speak at a trial of a notoriously corrupt governor of a longstanding reputation for the extortion courts and provincial “governance” being a joke:

I said I thought that there would come a time when foreign peoples would send delegations to Rome to request that the extortion law and this court would be abolished. For if there were no courts, they believe that each governor would only carry off enough for himself and his children. With the courts as they are now, on the other hand, they reckon each governor carries away enough for himself, his advocates, his supporters, the president of the court, and the jurors—in other words, an infinite amount. Their conclusion is that they are capable of satisfying the avarice of one greedy individual, but incapable of subsidizing a guilty man’s acquittal. How remarkable are our courts and how glorious the reputation of our order [i.e., senators], when the allies of the Roman people hope for the abolition of the extortion court, which our ancestors established for their benefit!...

…the provinces had been plundered and devastated…[and] the courts were behaving scandalously and disgracefully… (In Verrem I 41-42, 45)

The historian Sallust, writing of the same era and a bit later as a contemporary, wrote

…self-indulgence and arrogance, attitudes that prosperity loves, took over…the aristocracy twisted their “dignity” and the people twisted “liberty” towards their desires; every man acted on his own behalf, stealing, robbing, plundering. In this way all political life was torn apart between two parties, and the Republic, which had been our common ground, was mutilated.

…And so, joined with power, greed without moderation or measure invaded, polluted, and devastated everything, considered nothing valuable or sacred, until it brought about its own collapse. (The Jurgurthine War 41)

Polybius, writing over a generation earlier, saw things in much the same way, and judged Rome was already past its prime (The Histories 57-58). Rome’s new province of Asia, especially, suffered extreme abuse in terms of taxation by publicani in the early first century B.C.E., so that von Ungern-Sternberg can write of “universal dissatisfaction with Roman rule” in the East. “As a spectacle of greed,” Holland notes, “the rape of Pergamum was certainly blatant. The vast sway of the Republic’s power, won in the cause of the honor of Rome, stood nakedly revealed as a license to make money. The resulting gold rush was soon a stampede.” Rutilius Rufus, a
A vigorous young monarch, Mithridates VI Eupator of Pontus, a kingdom in Asia Minor on the Black Sea, challenged Roman regional supremacy as Rome was wracked by war in Italy, and he found eager support among the Asian provincials. A high level Roman official, Manius Aquillius, with major encouragement from publicani that were greedily hoping for a new Roman province that would be as profitable as Asia, apparently encouraged a Roman ally to attack Pontus. Mithridates, already asserting his power in the region, saw that Rome was distracted by the Social War (91-87) against its own Italian allies and took over most of Asia Minor in response, even overrunning Rome’s province of Asia in 89 and crushing the small Roman military force there; he had Aquillius executed by symbolically pouring molten gold down his throat, and he was enthusiastically greeted as a liberator, which was hardly surprising. Rome declared war before the end of the year, and Mithridates’s response was stunning: in 88, he secretly planned with the leaders of cities all across Asia a coordinated massacre of all Romans and Italians living in the region, sparing neither women nor children; some 80,000 people were slaughtered in a single night. Appian writes that “it became extremely clear that the people of Asia acted against them in this way as much out of hatred of the Romans as out of fear of Mithridates” (Mithridatic Wars 23). If that was not bad enough, the Athenians across the Aegean, forgetting the lessons Rome taught Greece over half a century earlier, invited the king to

liberate them and all Greece. Mithridates landed in Greece, soon to be confronted the Roman general and soon-to-be (temporary) tyrant/dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla; by 86 Sulla had taken Athens after a siege, sacked the city, and had many of its people killed. This would be the last serious mainland Greek challenge to Roman rule. After driving Pontic armies out of Greece, he reached terms with Mithridates, who accepted defeat but got off relatively lightly: Mithridates had to yield all new territory gained and pay an indemnity, but was otherwise free to stay in power in Pontus; Sulla was already thinking ahead to the civil war he would have to fight back in Italy and did not want to be bogged down in the East. After crossing over to Asia and exacting crushingly huge indemnity payments from the cities that had sided with Mithridates, forcing them to pay for his army’s upkeep at a very inflated rate, and also adding five years’ worth of back taxes to the bill, he then left for Rome in 84 to put a very bloody end to much of the Roman civil war. Asia and other places that had supported Mithridates were devastated, their people forced into oppressive debt to pay the exactions of Sulla, so not only Roman tax-collectors flocked back to Asia Minor, but also Roman moneylenders, charging obscene rates. Provincials who could not pay their obligations were enslaved. A small conflict emerged again between Rome and Mithridates a few years later, and as tensions rose Mithridates allied with the last anti-Sullan Roman general from the civil war, Quintus Sertorius, who was still holding out in Spain.47

In Rome, many had been unhappy with the lenient peace Sulla had given Mithridates; Rome and Pontus been playing for advantage over each other in the years since, and it was only a matter of time before Rome would undertake a major operation against its king. But a growing Pontus was also supposed to be incredibly wealthy; therefore, deciding who would receive the

command of the war against Mithridates was a major decision for the senate to make. In fact, it was jockeying for this honor between Sulla and another famous Roman general and statesman—Gaius Marius—that had sparked the civil war in Rome. Enter Lucullus Licinius Lucullus, who was “a humane and a highly cultured man, a philosopher and a historian steeped in Greek culture and possessing a genuine concern for the well-being of Rome’s subjects,” and his conduct in the war against Mithridates would more than demonstrate this. As Sulla’s old “right hand man” during several of his campaigns, including the one against Mithridates, and hailing from an old noble family, he had enough standing and support to win the consular elections for 75 and to be awarded the command for the war against Mithridates. That same year, another king died and bequeathed his realm to Rome, this time of Bithynia. What would follow would be a remarkable and unique example of a peace operation for the ancient world. Lucullus would lead the forces of Rome and succeeded in defeating Mithridates multiple times. The Pontic King fled to the Kingdom of Armenia, run by his son-in-law who protected him from Rome. Lucullus and his legions ended up chasing him all over Armenia and fought Armenia for harboring a Roman enemy, winning multiple victories and taking his army great distances. During the seven years he was in command in the East, Lucullus found many urgent needs of governance when he was not chasing Mithridates and fighting battles; Asia and much of the East was not only devastated by war, but was also devastated economically, financially, and socially from the massive debt and tax burden made worse by unscrupulous Roman publicani. While commanding a Roman army in the field, Lucullus engaged in serious political and economic reform in the provinces of the East. Roman bankers were charging 48% interest to the locals, locals desperately hoping to pay off Sulla’s indemnity but unable to do so under such high interest rates. Only these Roman bankers had enough financial resources to make the loans needed to make such payments, and
the *publicani* used this monopoly mercilessly and cruelly. By 70, the debt of the cities of Asia had increased six times over. But that was not the worst of it for Plutarch claimed that unspeakable and incredible misfortunes were rife in the province. Its people were plundered and reduced to slavery by the tax-gatherers and money-lenders. Families were forced to sell their comely sons and virgin daughters, and cities their votive offerings, pictures, and sacred statues. At last men had to surrender to their creditors and serve them as slaves, but what preceded this was far worse—tortures of rope, barrier, and horse; standing under the open sky in the blazing sun of summer, and in winter, being thrust into mud or ice. Slavery seemed, by comparison, to be disburdenment and peace. Such were the evils which Lucullus found in the cities, and in a short time he freed the oppressed from all of them (*Parallel Lives* Lucullus 20).

Lucullus cancelled all interest payments that were higher than the original amount borrowed, and capped monthly interest rates 1% (this would be an annual interest rate of around 12% or slightly higher than that if compounded); this was dramatically less than what was being previously charged. And he made sure all these changes were enforced. It only took four years for all the cities of Asia to pay off their debts from Sulla after these reforms. Konrad writes that “[t]his was his finest hour; no other act did as much to buttress Roman rule in Asia Minor.” Furthermore, even in his military actions, Lucullus was extraordinarily kind for a man of his time. When a major Armenian city was stormed by Lucullus after a siege, it was plundered and destroyed. But, contrary to general standards of the time, he spared the population and set them free, rather than enslaving or killing them. This was not new policy, but the same policy had had put into place when taking the cities of Pontus, except in some of those cases, he had even paid for and personally seen to repairs to the cities to fix the damage suffered from siege and combat and rebuild them. He was determined to show Rome’s better half, and was laying the foundation for future governance—and future peace—between Rome and its provincials. Unfortunately, his actions earned him the hostility of the *publicani* and their allies in the Senate; they succeeded in chipping away at his authority and command back in Rome, bit by over time, even as his troops, tired of marching such long distances for so long, not in love with their elitist commander who
lacked an ability to connect with the common man, semi-mutinied (these very troops had previously mutinied against other commanders) and undermined his ability to command.

Finally, in 67, accused of prolonging the war since Mithridates had yet to be caught, the Senate decided to replace him with Gnaeus Pompeius “Magnus” (see below). In many ways, Lucullus never recovered from this blow to his dignitas. Still, the sad end to his campaign engineered by the very publicani he fought does not change the level of his accomplishment. Plutarch writes that “Lucullus…was not only beloved by the peoples whom he had benefited, nay, other provinces also longed to have him set over them, and felicitated those whose good fortune it was to have such a governor” (20). 48 He continues:

Lucullus, after filling Asia full of law and order, and full of peace, did not neglect the things which minister to pleasure and win favor, but during his stay at Ephesus gratified the cities with processions and triumphal festivals and contests of athletes and gladiators. And the cities, in response, celebrated festivals which they called Lucullea, to do honor to the man, and bestowed upon him what is sweeter than honor, their genuine good-will. (23)

VI.) Pompeius Turns Pirates into Farmers

At this point in Roman history, piracy in the Mediterranean was a major problem, especially for Rome since it exercised authority and power all over the Mediterranean. Piracy had been a major factor in Rome’s first interventions on the other side of the Adriatic in Illyria; in fact, one could argue it was the domino that officially started Rome’s expansion into the eastern Mediterranean. States might cow before the might of Rome, but these pirates fought mainly for themselves, the ancient equivalent of the modern non-state actor. Still, they had a loose network of cooperation and alliance as they shared the same general interests, and usually refrained from attacking each other. There was no king that could be defeated to sue for peace,

no government to bend to Rome’s will. It was not uncommon for rich young Romans to be captured by pirates and held for ransom; Julius Caesar even went through this as a young man. They constantly raided and stole from any ship they could catch in the sea, and would often strike inland from the coast, too. Piracy grew in power and scope in part grew because Rome’s indirect style of administration as its empire grew contrasted with the more hands-on approaches of the powers it defeated, and also because its forcing of its major rivals (e.g., Macedon and the Seleucid Empire) to severely reduce their navies. Ptolemaic Egypt’s non-Roman spurred decline also was a factor in the naval power-vacuum. Some communities even paid pirates for protection or at least to be spared from attack. Sea travel was hazardous and risky, and not only did trade suffer, but the supply of grain to Rome, vital for keeping the masses fed and alive, was also being affected. Mithridates, during his long wars against Rome, even allied with, and supported with money and ships, the pirates to act against Rome. Mark Antony’s grandfather fought some of them and won a victory in 102, yet after his triumph—triumph as in a sort of special sacred victory parade/ceremony in Rome which was an extremely high honor and was rarely awarded—the pirates retaliated by capturing his daughter from her villa on the Italian coast. The problem was still serious enough that the Romans sent his son, Mark Antony’s father, against the pirates in 72, but he was defeated. Another Roman force was sent out against the pirates in 69, which achieved some success by taking and reducing a number of pirate strongholds on Crete. Progress was slow, one pirate citadel after another, and yet attacks only became worse after, with several senior Roman officials being captured off the Italian coast. The biggest shock came with the city of Rome’s major port, Ostia, fifteen miles from the capital, suffering from a pirate raid which saw a Roman war fleet burned, several famous senators captured, and, more importantly, the food supply severely affected. Famine threatened Rome,
and starving citizens took to the streets demanding action. Efforts in the past had been hampered or avoided by the publicani and their allies in the senate, as the pirates were central to the lucrative slave trade as the best suppliers of slaves, a commodity from which the publicani profited handsomely. But after Ostia, and with Romans facing starvation, with Roman power being successfully challenged by pirate rabble, something had to be done, and only one man would do for the public: Gnaeus Pompeius. A plebian with a common touch, he was given a third name (“Magnus:” the Great) by Sulla himself when he was one of Sulla’s favorite generals. Victories in the Social War and then the civil war, culminating in the final defeat of Sertorius in Spain, had made him famous; so had the fact that as a young man, he had his own private army, and won a triumph in Rome as a private citizen, without ever having held public or elected office. This was unprecedented, and he was already Rome’s most celebrated living general. To deal with the pirates, a special kind of unprecedented command, far exceeding the scope of a typical provincial command, requiring far more resources to implement, and for a special kind of general, would be required. The idea itself was very controversial for a Rome that was averse to concentrated powers and anything even remotely resembling a king or kingly power, and many senators opposed it; but a law calling for the creation of such a command, unparalleled in Roman history, passed in 67: a provincia of the entire Mediterranean coast, all Mediterranean islands, and fifty miles inward from the coast on all parts of the mainland. A massive fleet and a huge army and body of sailors and marines were authorized, and Pompeius was awarded the command. Such was the confidence of the Roman people in Pompeius that once the law was passed and before any action was taken, the price of grain in Rome dropped significantly.\(^49\)

\(^{49}\) Robin Seager, *Pompey the Great*, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 43-46; Holland, 164-170; Tatum, 192; von Ungern-Sternberg, 100; Goldsworthy 2004, 186-188; Robert Harris, “Pirates of the Mediterranean,” *The New*
This massive geographic command was split into thirteen zones, each with a distinguished senior commander; no commander could leave his area of responsibility, that way there would be no way for the pirates to have a free zone of operations. Pompeius himself, and possibly several of his subordinates, had fairly large fleets of their own that could go anywhere. Pompeius’s non-region-specific forces started in the west, moving to the east through the rest of the Mediterranean methodically, and literally cleared the whole sea of pirates in three months. Never expecting such a force to be arrayed against them, the pirates generally preferred to flee and then surrender instead of fight. Pompeius made it a point to accept surrenders from the pirates when normal practice for caught pirates was crucifixion; this encouraged the pirates to surrender en masse and inform on their brethren, and thus mercy produced good intelligence. Even at their inland strongholds, they rarely put up a fight and preferred to surrender to the

50 Potter, The Empire in 60 B.C. [http://www.thamesandhudsonusa.com/web/ancientrome/resources/ch3resources.html](http://www.thamesandhudsonusa.com/web/ancientrome/resources/ch3resources.html)
generous Pompeius. And here is one of the most brilliant episodes of Pompeius’s career: the 20,000 prisoners Pomepius took saw many of their pirate citadels destroyed, but were then settled on decent inland farmland purchased by Pompeius himself for them, or settled in various cities and towns in Asia Minor; this helped to begin a process of rebuilding and repopulation after the devastation of so many years of war against Mithridates in the region. Many settled in abandoned Soli, in Cilicia in southern Asia Minor. These men did well as traders, and renamed the city Pompeiopolis, while still more settled in a city in Greece called Dyme. Pompeius not only sought victory, he sought to build a better future for the whole Mediterranean, one which would give those previously engaged in violent behavior a future in different pursuits and a stake in the Roman system. Piracy was not eliminated from Mediterranean forever, but would not return to the devastating levels of before Pompeius’s campaigns again in the Roman era. For Tröster, “there is no reason to doubt that his clemency helped to bring the campaign to a speedy conclusion.” He concludes that “Pompey vis-à-vis the pirates clearly demonstrates the importance of conceiving transnational threats as complex phenomena that require not only military intervention but also a long-term commitment to provide peace, stability, and development.” Not only military, but “non-military means” were employed, both “the stick of Rome’s overpowering war machine and…the carrot of clemency, including the prospect of reintegration into civilian life.” Pomepius, like Lucullus, Flamininus, and other exemplary Romans understood the need for applying both “hard power” and “soft power.” Plutarch would explain Pompeius’s rationale behind his actions:

[The prisoners]…who were more than twenty thousand in number, he did not once think of putting to death; and yet to let them go and suffer them to disperse or band together again, poor, warlike, and numerous as they were, he thought was not well. Reflecting,

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51 Seager, 46-48; Holland, 170-171; Tatum 192; von Ungern-Sternberg, 101; Goldsworthy 2004, 188-190; Harris; Tröster, 26, 32-33.
therefore, that by nature man neither is nor becomes a wild or an unsocial creature, but is transformed by the unnatural practice of vice, whereas he may be softened by new customs and a change of place and life; also that even wild beasts put off their fierce and savage ways when they partake of a gentler mode of life, he determined to transfer the men from the sea to land, and let them have a taste of gentle life by being accustomed to dwell in cities and to till the ground. (*Parallel Lives*, The Life of Pompey 28)

VII.) Applications for Modern Peace Operations

a.) Lessons Learned: Greece

Greece presents a situation with a number of striking parallels to modern operations. As already shown, Romans were not terribly interested in Greek politics before the envoys of 201-200. Even once it was heavily involved in war in Greece the senate as a body was still remarkably ignorant of the basic geography—and therefore, geopolitics—of Greece; it needed a “lesson” on geography from the Greek envoys so they could understand what was happening in Greece. Eckstein notes that, rather than having any sort of grand plan or strategy, the frequently divided senators “in general…tended to just muddle through.”52 Numerous commentators on American policy, as far back as Alexis de Tocqueville, have noted the same thing.53 Rather than having any grand strategy, the American government behaves in a like manner. If it is not a nearby catastrophe, the urgency decreases. Various crises fester until one major crisis or another worsens enough that it merits a response, one which often requires subsequent, unanticipated follow-up operations. Americans, too, were quite ignorant of Iraq and Afghanistan well into both of the wars undertaken there, and still are. This is true for the public, but also for those crafting policy. Among policymakers ignorance and carelessness are relatively commonplace. This is almost a badge of honor in that is signifies lack of a true imperialist ambition. The “get-

in, then get-out” mentality of Americans today is not horribly different from Rome’s attitudes during the Republic. For a major power, there are always other problems to deal with both at home and abroad. As Dov Zakheim writes of recent U.S. interventions, “the United States simply could not maintain its focus on an area that no longer had “crisis” written all over it.”

Also, Rome, too, had a divided government, with competing interests between different office holders and offices, between different factions or pseudo-parties, that acted as checks and balances in a system based on separation of powers and annual elections. The number of variables are staggering in such systems, each affecting policy in unintended ways. President Obama and President Bush each had their own ideas about foreign policy, but 9/11 for Bush and inheriting two wars for Obama have forced their hands in many ways; thus the pressures of an international system are felt. Both Rome and the U.S. intervened in Greece and in Afghanistan and Iraq at least in part because recent tragedies—Hannibal and to a lesser degree Pyrrhus for Rome, 9/11 for the U.S.—made them feel they needed to act preemptively. Galba’s speech to the people about needing to fight the Macedonians overseas so Romans will not have to fight them in Italy is remarkably similar to George W. Bush’s argument that Americans need to fight terrorists “over there” so that Americans will not have to fight them “over here.” Somewhat naively, both Romans and Americans tried to give “freedom” to groups of people that never really had a strong, unified state. The Greeks fought each other constantly for most of their history; thus “Greece” in ancient times was never a unified political entity until the Romans

slowly turned it into one. The Aetolian league had risked Rome’s wrath just to be able to fight
their neighbors. Sunni, Shiites, and Kurds seem almost a simple division to the many different
and constantly switching loyalties and interests of Greece, but then one remembers that there is a
layer of tribal identity that the Romans would find familiarly confusing and similar to the fierce
conflicts between different Greek city-states. Afghanistan, too, is a horribly fractured, tribal
entity. Americans and Romans both hoped that, having removed identified threats (Macedonian
and Seleucid kings, Saddam Hussein and the Taliban) that peace would ensue, and either
completely withdrew (the Romans) or partially withdrew (the Americans), hoping the “liberated”
would be able to enjoy “peace.” When one looks at the general principles, there is not that much
difference between Rome’s withdrawals from Greece and then subsequent re-invasions to fix
earlier mistakes and the two “surges” in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both Rome and the U.S. were
eager to disengage without understanding the complex local and regional dynamics. Romans
failed to anticipate that in the postwar reality, even former allies that felt cheated by the
arrangements of the peace could become spoilers to it. This is really not much different from
American alliances with Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, Pashtuns or Tajiks at various stages in the
thees conflicts. At some point, each acted very contrary to American stated desires despite
previous American assistance and patronage. The Shiites, Sunnies, Kurds, Pashtuns, and Tajiks
take turns being the Aetolian League or various other Greek actors, and the groups are also often
divided among themselves. Especially with a hands-off approach, both Romans and Americans
should not have been surprised at the challenges to their visions for postwar Roman and
American wishes. With occupiers signaling their desire to leave or who had left, one should not
be surprised that Shiites in Iraq court Iranian intervention, Pashtuns court Pakistani intervention,
that the Aetolians courted Seleucid intervention or that some Greeks sided with Perseus or, later,
Mithridates. Rome and the U.S. also failed to anticipate that Macedon and the Seleucids, or Syria, Iran, and Pakistan, today, would take more active roles in the affairs of their neighbors as Rome and America drew down their presence, roles which might harm U.S. interests and did harm Roman interests.

In fact, ancient Greece is a perfect example of a complex, very diverse, very tribal artificial “state” with complex alliances and political units that often shift over time, with a long history of internecine conflict, and with meddlesome neighbors. Hoping to leave a Greece in freedom but under its influence, Rome time and time again was drawn back into conflict in Greece against its inclinations. In such a situation, one must balance the desire to give freedom, and be seen to be giving freedom, without sending mixed signals to the different groups in the state and to potentially troublesome neighbors. If the intervening state does not act forcefully enough, it will encourage rebellious behavior over time. This is seen with the Aetolian League and Muqtada al-Sadr, and in various places in Afghanistan where the U.S. was late asserting control or still has not. In some of these situations, perceived oppression at the hands of the intervening state might not be as important as the desire from one group or faction to gain at another’s expense, another who is seen to have received unfair benefits at the hands of the intervening state. Some Shiites were determined to gain at the cost of Sunnis, while many Sunnis distanced themselves from Americans because Americans were seen as Shiite allies.

Thus, the main lessons from Greece are twofold: 1.) a state engaging in a peace operation needs to understand as much as possible the “human terrain” and geopolitics of the region they are entering, to understand the relative power of the local players, what they want and how far they are willing to compromise, and how any actions aimed at one group will affect the perception and dispositions of the others. For example, if Rome had appreciated the
dissatisfaction of the Aetolian League more fully, further conflict may have been avoided. 2.)
The intervening state needs to be as clear as possible about its own intentions and expectations, and to have its own actions be in accordance with these. Lack of interest and involvement even when Roman wishes were ignored repeatedly created an atmosphere in Greece that encouraged the bold moves of various actors, from the Aetolian League to the Seleucid Empire. Confusion in general, often generated by Rome’s actions, and a lack of understanding of intentions across the board was a major conflict creator/multiplier that could have been avoided. Good intentions in speedy withdrawals, like the case of Roman withdrawals from Greece, must be balanced in their execution; if not, further interventions and “surges” might be necessary. Groups like the UN, NATO, and the AU that attempt peace operations must also consider this, as interventions in Haiti, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), just to name a few, show.

b.) Lessons Learned: Lucullus in the East

Lucullus recognized not only how important goodwill was to the success of establishing true peace, to bringing other units into the emerging Roman-run Mediterranean order, but especially how important it was to people who had suffered in no small part because of the abuses of other Romans. Even though Lucullus had to go against his own countrymen’s voracious interests, he did not hesitate. Rather, he stuck to his principles and the general ethos of good conduct and fair treatment, and energetically reigned in the publicani. For UN operations carried out by Europeans in places where colonial and postcolonial abuses are fresh in people’s memories, and for a U.S. intervening in Arab and Muslim countries with similar feelings, and with a justifiable anger at U.S. policies that have at best been inconsistent and at worst biased against them, this is a very similar situation. Lucullus’s operations were carried out over the course of seven years of campaigning, so he certainly had to be aware of the resentment this
generated among the powerful *equites* running the *publicani* and their allies back in Rome. Yet he did not waver even thought this became a major factor in the events that eventually cost him his command. Rome and the people of Asia Minor were lucky, since if someone of less ability or different character than Pompeius had been chosen, Lucullus’s gains among the people of Asia Minor for Rome might have been clumsily negated or wasted.

Lucullus’s operations in the East provide three lessons for modern peace-operations that are remarkably modern. 1.) Hearts and minds are as important as ever, and are the key to any peace operation. 2.) People from the state or regions that are not directly employed by the state/organization/region or under its control still reflect on the state/organization/region and can cause the intervening actors problems. Whether *publicani* or modern multi-national corporations, these actors cannot be given a free reign and must be tightly regulated. Serious abuses can sink or sabotage missions at worst or undermine them at the very best. Both the UN and the U.S. have had major problems with contractors and need to be much better at policing and regulating them so that Halliburtons and Blackwaters are the exception, not the norm. 3.) Politics always matters. Lucullus was brilliant and did much to improve relations between Rome and its provincials, yet corrupt politics at home cost him his job and threatened to undermine the goodwill and gains earned by Lucullus’s humanity and victories. There is no easy solution for dealing with domestic politics, and many of the states carrying out these operations today have complex domestic political situations that cannot be ignored. This issue needs to be more openly acknowledged, dealt with, and planned around when planning operations. Pompeius received far more resources than Lucullus for political reasons, and this is partly why Lucullus was not able to finish the war with the few resources he had. The American Republican Party ideology about small government turned out to be disastrous when put into practice in terms of resourcing
nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, resulting in more deaths, higher costs, longer wars, and the necessity for “surges” because of premature drawdowns. Such political issues can be said to be the x-factor in modern peace operations.

b.) Lessons Learned: Pompeius and the Pirates

Finally, Pompeius showed than the war needs to be carried out in a way that allows for a better future. He saw how crucial it was that former combatants effectively go through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, known as DDR, and be given a real shot at success in peacetime, or that they would go right back to being militants. The problems in modern wars with this are enormous. Problems with DDR have plagued peace operations in places like the DRC, Kosovo and Liberia, just to name a few. Most other Romans would have crucified the pirates; when Marcus Licinius Crassus put down Spartacus’s slave revolt, he crucified all the prisoners he had taken, 6,000 of them, on a 100-mile stretch of the Via Appia, one of Italy’s busiest roads.

There are three main lessons from the pirate war: 1.) unless a state is prepared to kill all those resisting, plans must be made for what all those currently resisting will do once hostilities cease. It is amazing how many conflicts are perpetuated from a failure to properly consider and resource this aspect of post-conflict operations. Right now, Iraq is doing better because that country provides increasing opportunity for Iraqis not fighting to engage in civil pursuits, as problematic as it is. Yet Afghanistan does not, comparatively, offer fighters much to do when they lay down their arms with its corrupt and weak government and dismal economy. The pirate problem in Somalia is not all that different from Pompeius’s situation: something must be found for these pirates to do in peace, or they will stay pirates. It is the same with Colombia’s coca
farmers or Afghanistan’s poppy farmers. 2.) Another major lesson from Pompeius is that “soft power” can be just as instrumental in winning a war as “hard power.” It seemed as if there was perhaps more surrendering than fighting in the pirate war. Lucullus showed the power of “soft power” with the civilian population, but Pompeius showed its potential with enemy combatants in time of war. This hardly works in all conflicts, but since peace operations are not generally also total wars, it should more applicable more often in these conflicts than in others. If lesson 1 is implemented well, “soft power” warfare can be effective as a counterinsurgency tool and can lead to a lasting arrangement 3.) Finally, Pompeius showed that when dealing with non-state actors that work in small groups and can melt away, overwhelming resources and a total coverage and dominance of the battle space can initially overwhelm the enemy. Small groups can slip away easily in general compared to large enemy army units, and especially if operations are under-resourced, while at the same time, if overwhelming force is applied, it can often greatly shorten the length of the conflict, balancing the costs; after all, the pirate operation for the whole Mediterranean Sea only lasted three months! More than a few commentators have suggested that a much larger force initially in Iraq or Afghanistan would have made a huge difference in initially establishing order and saved costs in the long run; one thinks of the public battle between Gen. Shinseki and Sec. Rumsfeld before the invasion of Iraq.55

Eckstein notes that “in terms of the fragility of states, the ancient Mediterranean was in all periods closer to the modern Third World.” Being that that is where most modern peace operations take place, how Rome “muddled through” dealing with such similar states and

55 Holland 146, Konrad 185.
peoples over centuries as an emerging and then the dominant power should be of interest to anyone involved in them.\textsuperscript{56}

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{56} Eckstein, \textit{Anarchy}, 259.