Rwanda Case Study
Part II: Refugees and Internally Displaced People Viewed Externally
This paper will present the issue of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) from the country of Rwanda before, during, and after the conflict which became known as the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994) and during which took place the genocide of 1994. After looking at the trajectory of refugees and IDPs in terms of the development of the conflict, the conflict itself, and were and continue to be a major issue post-conflict, this paper will examine how one international organization (IO), in this case the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), dealt with and still deals with IDPs and refugees stemming from Rwanda, and also how one non-governmental organization (NGO) handled and handles the same issues. This paper makes no claim to be a representative account of a large portion of the literature available on the subject, just representative of the sources cited.

i. Focus of Paper and Definitions

International law has created two categories for people displaced by conflict: refugees and internally displaced people, refugees being those who flee from their homes in their nation to another nation, specifically “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country;” internally displaces people (IDPs) being those who flee from their homes to another location within their nation (UNHCR 2010c, par. 3; UNHCR 2010d, par. 1). The United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees is the organization with primary responsibility for dealing with refugees, but the name of the office is misleading as its mandate has expanded since the organization’s founding to include dealing with the problem of IDPs as well; UNHCR currently places 129,109 people as refugees originating from Rwanda and no IDPs (UNHCR 2010b, par. 3, 5; UNHCR 2010a, par. 1). Large scale displacement of Rwandans in the modern era began with violent Hutu-Tutsi clashes on the eve of independence from Belgian colonial authorities, and it is the people fleeing their homes in Rwanda from these violent clashes and ensuing ones which will be the focus of this paper; large numbers of other Rwandans, especially Hutu as they were continually and increasingly oppressed by the Tutsi, left during the colonial era to go to neighboring colonies/states for economic reasons, especially going to serve as semi-slave labor in the Belgian Congo as King Leopold II’s and Belgium’s colonial policies had devastated the native Congolese population and created a huge labor shortage there, but these longer-term “Banyarwanda,” who in the Congo would become a huge portion of population of the Lake Kivu region, are not the subject of this paper (Scherrer 2002, 27-28; Mamdani 2001, 109-11; Prunier 1997, 63). Hutu or Tutsi refugees originating from other countries will also not be the focus of this paper.

As for the conflict, thought there has been some violence before and after, it will be defined in this paper as the period from the beginning of the Rwandan Civil War of the 1990s, form the fighting which broke out in October of 1990 through the genocide and until the Hutu regime was overthrown and the fighting in Rwanda between armed combatants ended shortly after the rise of the Tutsi regime in the summer of 1994.

A. Refugees and IDPs before the conflict

While tension and animosity between Hutu and Tutsi existed before the arrival of the German and Belgian colonialists and was greatly exacerbated and intensified by colonial policies, it was not until the near the end of Belgian colonial rule that conflict between the groups first produced large groups of people in the modern era that would fit the legal definition of refugee (Prunier 1997, 5-40, 48-50; Scherrer 2002, 26-28). As 1959 drew to a close, a Hutu activist was attacked by members of a Tutsi political party, and violent attacks and crackdowns as a response saw violence spread, with many Tutsi killed or imprisoned and large numbers of Tutsi houses burned as the Belgian administrators began shift favor to the Hutu as the contemplated ending their rule in Rwanda; by late in the year 1963, thousands of
Tutsi had fled Rwanda as refugees, some after first being IDPs there, to the Belgian Congo, areas that would later become part of Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi (Prunier 1997, 48-53; Scherrer 2002, 28-29; Hintjens 1999, 278). Jean-Pierre Chrétien (2003) puts this initial wave at 150,000, or about one-third of the total Tutsi population (2003, 305). In contrast, Gérard Prunier’s (1997) estimate of 130,000 (1997, 51). As violence and repression would continue over the next few years, this number of refugees would greatly increase (Scherrer 2002, 29; Prunier 1997, 61-62; Mamdani 160). Prunier (1997) discusses the numbers and the rapid growth of refugees by late 1964, noting that then UNHCR gave an official estimate of 336,000 total Rwandan refugees, with 200,000 in Burundi, 78,000 in Uganda, 36,000 in Tanzania, and 22,000 Zaire (formerly the Belgian Congo), but then argues that this is lower than what was likely the actual number; he notes that the estimate of 336,000 refugees figure for late 1964 is not large enough because it does not take into account refugees that settled outside of refugee camps, but that a counter-estimate of 500,000 is too large because it incorrectly includes some of the Banyarwanda living in Zaire and Uganda, so he estimates about 400,000 Rwandan refugees existed at the end of 1964 (1997, 62-64).

Prunier (1997) notes that as oppressive-to-Tutsi Hutu regime took over power from the Belgians in Rwanda, these Tutsi refugees “fared differently according to their countries of exile” (1997, 55).

The Refugees that fled to the Belgian Congo were not very fortunate; resenting the Belgian switch of support to the Hutu back in Rwanda, they joined one of the factions in the Belgian Congo that fought against the Belgians in the confusing civil war there, and were “militarily eliminated” by General Mobutu shortly before he came to power and became the renamed Zaire’s dictator for three decades, though the survivors were sometimes offered citizenship (Prunier 1997, 55; Mamdani 2001, 165). Conversely, the refugees which fled to what would become Tanzania, though “submitted to rigorous control to prevent them from undertaking military operations,” were otherwise well treated and generally allowed to integrate and settle there (Prunier 1997, 55; Mamdani 2001, 164).

The Burundian government was dominated by Burundian Tutsi and they were sympathetic to the Tutsi refugees in Burundi, not only allowing these refugees to use Burundi as a base from which they could strike into Rwanda by raiding and attacking the Hutu regime, but also engaging in counter-reprisals against Hutu in Burundi in response to repression of Tutsi in Rwanda (Prunier 1997, 55; Scherrer 2002, 30-31, 37; Mamdani 2001, 129; Hintjens 1999, 276-277). The Burundi-based Tutsi refugee attacks culminated in a failed invasion in December 1963, and the response from the Hutu regime was brutally effective: apart from executing every Tutsi politician then in Rwanda, and many thousands of Tutsi were massacred between December 1963 and January 1964 (Prunier 1997, 56; Mamdani 2001, 129-131; Chrétien 2003, 306; Scherrer 2002, 29, 38). The year 1973 saw a new attack into Rwanda from militant Tutsi launched from Burundi, and this would only spawn a new series of repressive policies and violence against Tutsi in Rwanda, in turn producing yet another wave of Rwandan Tutsi refugees (Prunier 1997, 60-61; Scherrer 2002, 38). Tension and violence between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi, spurred in part by the problems and realizations put forward by the presence of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Burundi, would continue all through the period before the outbreak of the Rwandan Civil War in 1990 (Chrétien 2003, 309-317).

Moving onto Uganda, Mahmoud Mamdani (2001) compares the general situation of Rwandan refugees who ended up there with the circumstances of Palestinians in the Middle East (2001, 165). By 1964 seven camps had been established for refugees, with an eighth added in 1982, but there was not enough room in the camps for all of them; they generally had access to education through UNHCR programs (Ibid., 165-166). The situation for the refugees in Uganda was difficult and complicated, as they were initially supported by the Ugandan king which “earned them automatic hostility” from Uganda’s Prime Minister Milton Obote as the two men competed politically; Obote would overthrow the king in 1966 (Prunier 1997, 55-56). His regime first regime would be marked by discrimination against the refugees, which led to some grateful refugees working for the regime of the man who would overthrow Obote, his own army commander Idi Amin, but some of them would fight the new regime.
Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema, two Rwandan refugees who had fled to Uganda, became part of a guerilla resistance movement in the early 1970s against the Amin regime led by Ugandan rebel Yoweri Museveni, which continued after Obote came back into power in 1980 in a sham election; because of involvement of such Rwandans and that, common among his group, a grandmother of his was a Rwandan Tutsi, Museveni and his movement were accused by the restored Obote of being Tutsi Rwandan in 1982 (Prunier 1997, 67-69; Chrétien 2003, 299; Scherrer 2002, 49-50; Mamdani 167-168).

Obote and his regime engaged in a general crackdown on the Rwandan refugees and Banyarwanda, blaming them for all sorts of problems, his officials and supporters killing, raping, and looting (Prunier 69-70; Chrétien 2003, 299; Scherrer 2002, 50; Mamdani 2001, 168-169; Otunnu 1999, 19). Close to 100,000 Banyarwanda and Rwandan Tutsi refugees fled their homes in Uganda, most becoming internally displaced in internment camps within Uganda, but some fleeing to other countries, many to Kenya as the Rwandan government did what it could to prevent most Tutsi from entering Rwanda and interned into camps those that did; these actions by the regime drove many of the Banyarwanda/Rwandese Tutsi community in Uganda into Museveni’s guerilla National Resistance Army (NRA) and they were a significant part of the NRA force that overthrew the Obuto regime and installed Museveni in 1986 (Prunier 1997, 69-70; Chrétien 2003, 299; Scherrer 2002, 39; Mamdani 2001, 169-170; Otunnu 1999, 20-22). Importantly for the future of Rwanda, they gained years of military experience, and once Museveni were in power, were integrated into what became a regular army instead of a guerilla one when even more Banyarwanda/Rwandese refugees were recruited into the NRA to fight challenges to the new regime’s authority and Rwigyema had become Uganda’s army commander and defense minister; refugees/Banyarwana were also the a key component of the officer corps of Uganda’s army (Prunier 1997, 70-72; Mamdani 2001 172-174).

Yet during these military operations of the new Ugandan regime, two Banyarwandan officers were legitimately accused of war crimes in 1989 and suddenly, Museveni began to view the Banyarwanda/ Rwandan refugee presence in the army as hindering his efforts at trying to reach a general Ugandan peace, just at the time that Rwandan refugees and Banyarwanda who had fought for a new Uganda, and from all over the world, were coming to see Uganda as a place where they could be accepted and begin to comfortably call home (Prunier 1997, 71-72; Mamdani 2001, 174-175). On top of the war crimes and the fact that Obote’s regime’s remnants were hostile to the Banyarwanda/ refugees then, their arrival in large numbers in Uganda meant they also began taking up more economic resources and jobs, breeding resentment of other local Ugandan groups; in response to all of this, Museveni removed Rwigyema from his posts and sent Kagame abroad to study at an American military academy, and the Banyarwanda/Rwandan refugees all of sudden began to fear for their position in Uganda once again (Prunier 1997, 72-73; Scherrer 2002, 50; Mamdani 2001, 182). Prunier (1997) comments that on top of the firing, “rumours of a ‘Banyarwanda census’ seemed like a nightmare revisited,” as Obote had talked of census of Rwandans living in Uganda both in 1969 and 1983, and now even Rwandans who had not thought of returning to their true homeland started to dream of it (1997, 73). Mamdani, too, notes that the Ugandan experience propelled the movement towards a Rwandan homecoming, and further adds that a violent Ugandan debate and struggle over squatters—many of them Banyarwanda/refugees—in ranch areas would leave the refugees feeling especially discriminated against, further orienting their thoughts towards giving up on permanently settling in Uganda and eyeing their old Rwandan homeland to the south just before the beginning of the Rwandan Civil War (2001, 176-182).

In a general sense, the exile years for the Rwandan Tutsi community in this whole region of Africa actually allowed them to become closer, mostly eliminating barriers and structures that had divided them while still in Rwanda and uniting them with a shared identity defined by a new, similar shared history of being refugees (Prunier 1997, 65-66). At the same time the Uganda-based Rwandans were giving up hope of calling Uganda their new home, a global conference of Rwandan refugees that took
place in Washington, DC, in 1988 affirming a “Right of Return” (Prunier 1997, 173-174; Chrétien 2003, 320). Throughout the 1980s, the community had been and organizing, with much of leadership and movement initially based in Uganda, but then having to flee to neighboring Kenya for obvious political reasons; after the rise of Museveni, they returned to Uganda and in late 1987 rebranded themselves the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), with Rwigyema as their leader (Prunier 1997, 65-67, 72-73; Scherrer 2002, 50; Mamdani 175).

Mamdani examines several estimates of the total Rwandan refugee population in 1990, and find the most convincing argument to be for about 500,000, noting that UNHCR’s official number of registered refugees was significantly lower, with 383,000 total: 266,000 in Burundi, 82,000 in Uganda, Tanzania with 22,000, and 13,000 in Zaire (2001, 161). Prunier (1997) discusses the different Banyarwanda migrant groups in the region, as opposed to refugees, and discusses population growth rates and how they should be applied in determining a figure, eventually arriving at an estimate of 600,000-700,000 to fit with the legal definition of refugee, covering the period of flights from 1959-1973 (1997, 61-64).

This unresolved refugee issue would loom large in the following decades for Rwanda and the region as a whole. In the last few decades before the Rwandan Civil war of the 1990s, Mamdani argues that, unique for its region, the Rwandan regime’s “greatest single failure was that it was unable to even post the question of how to integrate the Tutsi diaspora within the postcolonial polity,” which has been defined exclusively in terms of its Hutu nationalism (2001, 155-156). Rwanda’s ruler, Juvenal Habyarimana, and his regime, has entertained discussions and commissions, but “had never done any serious work” on the issue (Prunier 1997, 74). The stage, then, was set for a conflict between the Rwandan diaspora, especially the Tutsi refugees, many of whom by 1990 were intent on returning to Rwanda, and the ruling Habyarimana Hutu regime in Rwanda which had been intent on keeping Rwanda Hutu nation run by Hutus.

B. Refugees and IDPs during the conflict

In the late 1980s, the RPF set on a course of action that would allow it be able to take a portion of Uganda’s largely Rwandan-Tutsi-run NRA and invade Rwanda, taking over the capital and deposing the Habyarimana regime; this was with at least admitted initial tacit, and then after the invasion, active support from Museveni (Prunier 1997, 74, 91-92; Mamdai 2001, 175, 182; Scherrer 2002, 50). On October 1st, 1990, a Tutsi-refugee-led group of largely Rwandan Tutsi units of Uganda’s NRA, now calling themselves the armed wing of the RPF, or Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), invaded Rwanda and ignited the Rwandan Civil War; more detached NRA, now RPF/RPA (RPA was generally referred to by RPF and this paper will follow that trend), units followed so that several thousand took part in the invasion (Prunier 1997, 93; Mamdani 2001, 186; Chrétien 2003, 320). On the second day, under strange circumstances, RPF’s leader, Maj. Gen. Rwigyema, a hero to Tutsi for years, was killed and soon after the initial RPF invasion failed dramatically, but by the end of November, Maj. Paul Kagame, training in the U.S., had quickly left and returned to assume command of the RPF and a vigorous regrouping effort (Prunier 1997, 94-96, 114-115; Mamdani 2001, 186; Chrétien 2003, 321; Scherrer 2002, 50-51).

Within a year, Kagame and his RPF had increased greatly in size and would keep increasing exponentially in the following years, drawing many recruits from the Tutsi refugees of the regional states, especially Burundi but also Tanzania and Zaire and controlled a significant portion of Rwandan territory bordering Uganda, with every victory creating a significant number of IDPs as Rwandan Hutu fled the RPF (Prunier 1997, 116-117, 135; Mamdani 2001, 186). As the end of 1990 approached, some 80,000 people had been internally displaced; by early 1992, this number had reached 300,000-350,000, and after February 1993, it was 950,000 and possibly reaching 1.1 million, these people fleeing in a combination of choice and or on the recommendation, then later moved by the force, of the RPF (Mamdani 2001, 187-189, 204; Prunier 1997, 136). Mamdani provides several specific examples of how massive the flight of
people became; the area that had come under control of the RPF by late 1992 had recently been one of the highest population density areas in all of Africa, but the RPF only found 2,600 civilians when they took it over, while after another major round of fighting early in 1993, 1,800 people remained in an area that had had 800,000 before the war (2001, 187). The huge numbers of displaced people only continued to grow as the war dragged on, and the collapse of the Rwandan economy as a result of the war only made dealing with the refugee/IDP problem more difficult, but the United Nations World Food Programme responded with a massive airlift of food to try to ameliorate the situation and feed the displaced (Prunier 1997, 184).

It is also noted that the RPF onslaught changed the psychology of the Hutu peasants, bringing “to life memories long since buried under the weight of day-to-day concerns,” that the old memories of a brutal, feudal, oppressive Tutsi monarchy “came alive as the civil war progressed,” and the RPF came to be seen as the “reincarnation” of the old colonial-era Tutsi regime (Mamdani, 2001, 187-188 and quoting Newbury and Newbury 1995). The RPF invasion actually served to resuscitate the murderous Hutu ideology regarding Tutsi which had receded and become “fringe” over the past few decades; with the refugee-invasion-sparked Rwandan Civil War, the same ideological racist forces that had driven the violence which had created the Tutsi refugees in the first place moved back “to the mainstream of respectable politics” (Ibid., 189) This incarnation would be known as “Hutu Power” and would mark the Tutsi as an alien race bent on depriving the Hutu of power, forcing them into servitude, even killing the Hutu, and it was this fear which drove the killing of Rwandan Tutsi during the Civil War and the genocide (Ibid., 189-191). Many of the Hutu who did flee fled in part of because of rampant propaganda about the evils of the Tutsi from Hutu media while likely encountering little or no violence themselves (HRW 1994, 8). When the RPF began committing atrocities in February of 1993, this only intensified the flight of Hutus and increased the number of IDPs, discouraging the liberal Hutu opposition from seeking a peace and helping to perpetuate the conflict, until later during the genocide one-half of Rwanda’s population had left their homes and “were on the roads, having become political shuttlecocks between the collapsing government, the RPF” and an intervening French military force (Opération Turquoise) (Prunier 1997, 174-176, 184, 295).

An agreement between RPF and the Rwandan government detailing refugee/IDP repatriation, as one of many agreements comprising the Arusha peace accords, was signed on June 9th 1993 (Prunier 1997, 192). Yet contrary to the agreement, Rwanda’s military—the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR)—prevented displaced people from returning to their homes if their homes were in RPF-controlled territory; for many Hutu, Arusha’s promise to resettle all refugees meant a massive return of the Tutsi diaspora, which they felt would destroy all that Hutu had gained since the 1959 revolution, and this point was emphasized by Hutu nationalist media to help radicalize the population and make peace even less likely (Prunier 1997, 196; Mamdani 2001, 211).

Events in Burundi were to make the situations for everyone in Rwanda far more difficult when its first ever Hutu President, fairly elected, was assassinated by hardline Tutsi army officers late in October of 1993; violence in Burundi, with the Hutu masses responding to the assassination by massacring thousands of Tutsi, and the mostly Tutsi army responding to this by massacring thousands of Hutu, with about 300,000 Hutu fleeing Burundi into Rwanda into what was already a crowded refugee/IDP situation (Prunier 1997, 199; Mamdani 2001, 205; Chrétien 2003, 327-328). The event energized extremist Hutu and served to spread the idea of mass killing to a far more acceptable level as the Burundian Tutsi army killings of Hutu and the presence of so many Burundian Hutu fearful for their lives in Rwanda (and many with accompanying horror stories of abuse at the hands of Tutsi) increased the climate of fear greatly for Rwandan Hutu; kill or be killed was becoming a more common mentality among them, and these developments were certainly heavily emphasized by Rwandan Hutu media (Prunier 1997, 200-201; Mamdani 2001, 204-205).

As with the other Tutsi invasions in the past, this Hutu regime responded from the beginning by repressing and killing Tutsi in Rwanda, with some of the Interahamwe militias that would take part in the
genocidal killings formed with large numbers of Hutu IDPs created as a result of RPFs invasion or from the Burundian Hutu refugees who fled into Rwanda after their president was assassinated; the Burundian Hutu refugees may have actually committed some of the worst violence in Rwanda during this period (Prunier 1997, 109-110, 136-139, 246-247; Chrétien 2003, 333; Mamdani 2001, 205-206). When the genocide began in April of 1994, 200,000-400,000 Brundian Tutsi Refugees were present, but this number fell to as low as 80,000 during May when the genocide was well underway (Mamdani 2001, 205, 333 n59; HRW 1994, 9). It was the mysterious and controversial shooting down of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane in Rwanda on April 6th, 1994, that set in motion the genocide itself that very same night (Chrétien 2003, 329-331; Prunier 229-230). Some of the IDPs that would emerge during the genocide were even Hutu who, so ashamed of the killing they themselves had done, simply fled the scene of the atrocities (Prunier 1997, 247-248). Christian Scherrer (2002) contends that many of the Hutu fleeing to other countries like Tanzania “had left their bloody machetes behind at the border posts;” he notes that of the more than two million refugees, a large number were the perpetrators of the genocide, who then became the major recipients of UN and NGO as they impartially helped these people labeled as refugees, while the few Tutsi survivors inside Rwanda received little aid in contrast (2002, 144-146). Prunier (1997) also corroborates that many perpetrators fled and, technically, became refugees (1997, 265).

Not many of the Tutsi (and some of the liberal/moderate Hutu) who were targeted, and became IDPs, survived, in part because anyone seen as even slightly helping Tutsi would be targeted themselves; many fled to churches, schools or hospitals for protection, and were simply killed in the churches, schools, or hospitals, but a few thousand did find some protection inside a major sports stadium in the capital of Kigali where United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) troops prevented would-be killers form entering the stadium, yet the FAR managed to get a few solid artillery shots into the stadium anyway (Prunier 1997, 253-254, 260; Mamdani 2001, 228). Prunier (1997) puts his rough estimates as 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi killed in about three months, with about 130,000 left alive after the killing stopped; at that point, the number of refugees were about 300,000, most of whom were Hutu who had fled to Tanzania, but some of whom were Tutsi and Hutu who had fled to Burundi and many of refugees found themselves in awful conditions, with NGO and UN workers being deliberately hampered by FAR and the Interahamwe, their Tutsi staff killed right in front of them, and the killing even continued in the refugee camps (Prunier 1997, 254, 265-267; HRW 1994, 9).

The RPF still continued to look for new members during the genocide, finding many recruits in the new Rwandan Tutsi IDPs but also from the exiles in Burundi during the genocide period, and some of these newcomer were more revenge-minded than the original Ugandan refugee contingent; it was during this time that 1,500 out of about 25,000 Hutu refugees/IDPs in the area of Kabgayi were massacred by the RPF (Prunier 1997, 270-272).

With the remnants of the Hutu regime on the run, France announced what it termed a “humanitarian intervention:” Opération Turquoise beginning on June 23rd, 1994 (Ibid., 273, 291). The Interahamwe and local Hutu regime officials “enthusiastically” greeted their European patron of recent years by waving French flags when the first French troops arrived, who then began their mission by securing one camp of 8,000 IDPs/refugees and found other small groups “here and there, but not many” (Ibid., 291-292). In mid, July, thousands of IDPs/refugees started moving towards a partially secure French Safe Humanitarian Zone (SHZ) covering about 20% of Rwanda’s territory, many of them having been displaced more than once by this point in time; three million refugees/IDPs were on the move by the

time Kigali fell to the RPF, about half of them going to the SHZ (Ibid., 295, 297) Also, mixed in with refugee columns at this point were many FAR and *Interahamwe*, and even some Tutsi refugees from Uganda were returning to Rwanda, with their cattle herds (Ibid., 298). July 18th was the day when the RPF formed a new government in Kigali, and at his time over 1 million Hutu had fled to Zaire in a week’s time, and by this time 1.2 million IDPs/refugees had gathered in the SHZ, Ugandan and even more Burundian Tutsi Rwandan refugees embarking on their long-awaited homecoming, taking many of the newly empty land and houses, but even sometimes forcing the locals out; concurrently, some of the final wave of RPF recruits started abusing their power, feeding into Hutu extremist propaganda in the camps when this news reached them (Ibid., 299-301).

The new Tutsi government, however, knowing so much of its power base in Rwanda had been murdered, were not looking for an immediate resolution to the problem of Hutu refugees repatriation, and the Hutu who had fled to eastern Zaire had to face a new enemy: a cholera outbreak that was killing 600 people a day near the end of July, which would eventually kill about 30,000 people, and though the U.S. government promised and delivered rapid aid, it was delivered very ineffectively (Ibid., 302-304). Yet even at this stage, the authoritarian nature of the old Rwandan Hutu regime was reemerging: even in the refugee camps, local officials still held their power over the people who had lived under them in Rwanda, and they organized themselves physically in the camps based on their geographic locations when they were still in Rwanda (Ibid., 304). Faced with chaos all over the region and a deadly cholera, the UNHCR High Commissioner thought it best not to move right away on resettling refugees, while back in Rwanda, about 100,000 refugees repatriated themselves by early August even as some of the Hutu perpetrators of the genocide found a safe haven in the SHZ (Ibid., 305-308). Fear of the RPF reigned supreme still among Hutu, so many of the refugees in the SMZ started to leave there for Zaire even before France’s mission there ended as retributions exacted on Hutu by Tutsi increased; even in mid-August, new Hutu refugees fled south to Burundi, while many more Tutsi were coming in from Burundi, but UNHCR had to halt this as FAR remnants began threatening returning Tutsi (Ibid., 308-311). As for *Turquoise*, France had prevented total chaos, but had hardly established order or a truly safe zone, as half-million people fleeing from the French zone more or less can justify this interpretation (Ibid., 311). Mamdani argues that, in the end, *Turquoise* served more to protect Hutu war criminals and regime remnants than actually help refugees, IDPs, or stop the genocide (Mamdani 2001, 214, 254-255).

**C. Refugees and IDPs Post-Conflict**

With UNAMIR exceptionally weak, the withdrawal of French troops mean Rwanda was effectively now under RPF control: RPF had won Rwanda back, and not Rwanda was their problem (Prunier 1997, 308, 311). Scherrer (2002) notes that the most rapid movement of refugees ever in the history of the world was underway, Zaire’s dictator Mobutu, favoring the overthrown Hutu regime, “welcoming” 1.5 million to Zaire, while refugees numbering 600,000 went to Tanzania, 270,000 to Burundi, an 10,000 to Uganda all from Rwanda, according to Scherrer (Scherrer 2002, xiv). At the time, estimates of refugees varied widely, but Prunier (1997) gives some credence to UNHCR’s numbers for that November, even admitting they may be “exaggerated:” 270,000 to northern Burundi, 577,000 to Western Tanzania, 10,000 to southwestern Uganda, and in Zaire: 850,000 to Goma, 332,000 to Bukavu, 62,000 to Uvira, with a total UNHCR figure of 2.1 million; other organizations put the number much lower at 1.7 and 1.3 million, while in Rwanda itself the estimates of IDPs ranged from 1.8 million to 1.3 million, all of these out of a total Rwandan population of 7 million including refugees and IDPs (Prunier 1997, 312-313).

After an initial small number of returning refugees, the politics of the situation made it clear that the refugees would not be able to come home for at least some time, for it was too dangerous in Rwanda for Hutu, many of whom had just put down their overly-sued machetes, and, conversely, there were still organized factions of the former regimes operating in the camps that the new RPF government did not want returning; furthermore, the former Hutu regime still exercised authoritarian control over their own people in the camps, killing dissenters (Ibid., 313-314). A major problem the humanitarian community
was facing was that distribution of their aid in the camps was controlled by the overthrown Hutu regime’s elements: they got the aid first, the FAR, then the Interahamwe, and only then would there be aid not given, but sold to the regular people for money to finance the political and military ambitions of the Hutu Power movement, for whom this was just a break in the fighting; UNHCR and the NGO community had been manipulated into providing resources and bases for the regrouping a network of mass-murderers in ways that perpetuated violent conflict and prevented the resettlement of refugees (Prunier 1997, 314-315; Scherrer 2002, 146-147, 169-192).

Even as early as September 1994, Hutu militants originating from the camps in Zaire were attacking the RPF in Rwanda’s southwest; smaller clashes would flare up again that December up and down Rwanda’s western border, and internal UN reports at the time conceded that there was no UN control of the camps, only that of the Hutu extremists and militias, who by their own volition had halted the movement of repatriation of refugees, preferring to wait and build up for an invasion that would overthrow the new Tutsi regime in Rwanda (Ibid., 315-316). For Gen. Kagame, justice and the trying of those who carried out the genocide was a prerequisite to repatriation (Ibid., 342-343). The fighting between RPF and the Hutu refugees was being eyed by Zaire’s Mobutu and Uganda’s Museveni (and certain Western powers) in terms of implications for their rivalry with each other, a context that would become an eventual nightmare for all of Central Africa (Ibid., 317-320).

While representatives of the new Tutsi regime in Rwanda and Mobutu worked out an agreement, in principle, with UNHCR on repatriating refugees, France and Mobutu colluded to provide arms to these Hutu refugee militants, escalating the conflict (Scherrer 2002, xiv-xv; Prunier 1997, 320-321). Meanwhile, roughly 700,000 Tutsi refugees had returned from long exiles in neighboring states to Rwanda since the waning days of the Rwandan Civil War; yet the especially violent experiences of Tutsi coming from Burundi, combined with the lack of training of the last round of RPF recruits during the genocide, helped to further the climate of violent reprisals against Hutu in Rwanda (Prunier 1997, 321-322, 325, 326). Southern Rwanda even still had 600,000 IDPs at the end of 1994, but many of these people resettled in 1995; however, an attempt to clear out one camp by force in April led to the massacre of 4,000 people by the Randan Tutsi authorities; the remaining IDPs were forced out of camps, some returning home, some fleeing, with 60,000 ominously “unaccounted for” (Prunier 1997, 363).

In the midst of all this violence, Mobutu tried to use the Rwandan Hutu forces in Zaire to strike at his own recalcitrant Congolese Tutsi population in the east; when this produced Congolese Tutsi refugees fleeing into Rwanda, Kagame pressured UNHCR to opening new camps right by the Hutu camps across the border in Zaire, only a fraction of whom had been resettle, to help offset the pressure he was feeling from attacks stemming from the camps (Prunier 2009, 56-58). With the Burundian government teetering dealing with its own Hutu rebels, for Kagame, the situation was intolerable; after planning with numerous African heads of state (particularly Uganda) and earning their support, he invaded Zaire late in 1996 to deal with the remnants of the Hutu mass-murderers and their refugee camps once and for all; he, nor any of the other participants, had, any inkling that this would be the start of Africa’s World War, the largest and deadliest war in the world since WWII (Ibid., 66-72).

The presence of militant Hutus from Rwanda in eastern Zaire encouraged the militarization of Congolese Tutsi significantly and set in motion conflict dynamics there that, when supported by the invading Rwandan, would set the stage for the collapse of Mobutu’s regime; in the process of elevating an eastern Congolese Tutsi rebel named Laurent Kabila to replace Mobutu, a massive conflict involving a multitude of problematic regimes erupted in central Africa (Mamdani 2001, 253-261; Scherrer 2002, 151-153, 155-157; 251-252; Prunier 113-125; Chrétien 2003, 337-339). In the confused mess of a war with dozens of factions and militias, the Hutu extremist problem was partly “solved” in the sense that hundreds of thousands of the refugees were killed by various factions and hundreds of thousands of others were actually repatriated back to Rwanda; but a hardline core remained, and still fight on in 2010 against the government of The Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Congolese Tutsi, and Rwanda, despite the deployment for some years of the world’s largest United Nations deployment of troops (Prunier 2009, 143-148).
The publication of a new UN report in October of 2010, detailing massive human rights abuses in Eastern Congo by many different groups, including the army of Rwanda, have opened serious discussions that there may have been a second genocide perpetrated by Tutsi Rwandan government forces against the Rwandan Hutu, not only in Rwanda after the genocide but also for several years after that in violence in the Congo directed at Rwandan Hutu refugees; the reaction from the Rwanda government has been one of anger, showing that the emotions surrounding the violence of the 1990s that continues sporadically today are still very strong (Gettlemen and Kron 2010). Even as a of a few days before the completion of this paper, the Rwandan Hutu refugees left over from 1994 are killing people in the region (AFP 2010).

D. **International Organization: UNHCR**

Here will be discussed the history and refugee/IDP-related efforts of an IO.

**UNHCR Background**

The UNHCR envisioned was part of the effort at a new world order to come from the ashes of World War II; created on December 14th, 1950 to help resettle European people displaced from World War II, 1951 would see its guiding legal framework, the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, promulgated on July 28th (Ibid., par. 1). After this crisis, its first major challenge was the flow of refugees from Hungary after the 1956 Soviet invasion, and the next decade would see a whole new continent challenge the UNHCR as Africa was decolonized (Ibid., par. 2). As the century wore on, crises in Latin America and Asia would truly make the UNHCR a global agency, and more wars in Africa and Europe, “turning full circle,” would see its efforts refocused to its original operating locations as the century drew to a close and a new one dawned (Ibid., par. 2-3). For its efforts, it won the 1954 and 1981 Nobel Peace Prizes (Ibid., par. 4).

From its founding year, with a budget of US$300,000 and 34 staff, the UNHCR now has a budget of US$2 billion and a staff of 6,650 people in 118 countries, in over 250 offices, including a headquarters based in Geneva, Switzerland (Ibid., par 4-5). Today it services over 34.4 million people (Ibid., par. 5). The UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) runs the UNHCR; a 79-person UNHCR Executive Committee makes the major decisions regarding programs and the organization’s budget, as presented by the High Commissioner (who is now currently António Guterres), every two years (UNHCR 2010e, par. 1). As described in its mission statement,

UNHCR's primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. In its efforts to achieve this objective, UNHCR strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, and to return home voluntarily. By assisting refugees to return to their own country or to settle permanently in another country, UNHCR also seeks lasting solutions to their plight...

UNHCR seeks to reduce situations of forced displacement by encouraging states and other institutions to create conditions which are conducive to the protection of human rights and the peaceful resolution of disputes. In pursuit of the same objective, UNHCR actively seeks to consolidate the reintegration of returning refugees in their country of origin, thereby averting the recurrence of refugee-producing situations. (UNHCR 2010f, par. 2, 5)

The UNHCR did not originally assist IDPs, “but because of the agency’s expertise on displacement, it has for many years been assisting millions of them, more recently through the ‘cluster approach.’ Under this approach, UNHCR has the lead role in overseeing the protection and shelter needs of IDPs as well as coordination and management of camps” (UNHCR 2010d, par. 2). The UNHCR estimated that there were 26 million IDPs worldwide at the close of 2008, with 14.4 million of them being
assisted by the organization in 22 countries, including the nations of Sudan, Colombia, and Iraq, with the world’s three largest IDP populations as the close of 2008 (Ibid., par 3). The UNHCR also classifies IDPs as those displaced by natural disaster, but the “UNHCR is only involved with this group in exceptional circumstances, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 and 2008’s Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (Ibid., par 4).

UNHCR Rwandan Refugee/IDP Support

UNHCR has a long history of dealing with refugees from Rwanda, going back to the 1960s, where UNHCR provided food and advocating on their behalf, but civil war in the Congo forced UNHCR out of the picture for a few months in 1964, but resumed operations that November, assisting thousands of refugees, including helping to airlift refugees to safety (UNHCR 2000a, 50-52). In the 1990s, a major challenge for UNHCR was dealing with refugee camps where militants were mixed in with more peaceable refugees; even professional soldiers will often shun trying to disarm such groups in such conditions, seriously hurting UNHCR’s ability to perform its role in such camps, but stayed active in camps totaling millions and then hundreds of thousands of Rwandans despite the risks (UNHCR 2000b, 249-250). Increasing violence and armed conflict destabilizing the entire region furthermore hampered UNHCR’s efforts in the region, with the organization even finding itself stuck in the middle of political and military maneuverings between two different Rwandan factions and the ambitions of Zaire’s Mobutu, and unsuccessfully lobbied the United Nations Security Council for more aid; failing this, it tried to rely on local security forces, but this ended in disaster, as did repatriation efforts due to lack of cooperation from the relevant government authorities (Ibid., 254-255, 258). The opening of new refugee camps for Tutsi near the camps groups of older Hutu refugees complicated matters further, and when the more war erupted in October 1996, specifically in and around the refugee camps, UNHCR was forced to suspend operations; UNHCR offices were specifically targeted (Ibid., 259, 262-263). Still, only days after the violence, UNHCR was operational again in the camps in question, but the situation remained desperate; only limited repatriation was able to occur, and the fighting in the camps made it difficult, and politically sensitive, to account for all the refugees, many of whom were killed; still, the efforts of UNHCR were able to find many refugees who had been forced to flee during the fighting in the newly named Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Ibid., 264-273).

UNHCR currently services nearly 130,000 Rwandan refugees, mainly in the DRC (UNHCR 2010a, par. 1-2). Recent developments cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC has led to 3,800 refugees being recently repatriated and has seen 500 Hutu militia members of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), successor to the FAR and Interahamwe, “demobilized, repatriated and reintegrated into Rwandan society” (Ibid., par. 5). Current challenges are fatigue among some of the refugees, overcrowding and limited resources in the camps, and lack of feminine hygiene products; it major goals currently involve helping to see to a fair process for asylum seekers, helping to protect refugees, helping refugees to meet basic needs including sanitation, and trying to find more lasting resolutions to the problems of refugees (Ibid., par. 7-13). More specifically, UNHCR would like to see the strengthening of Rwanda’s National Refugee Council and asylum process; protect 53,000 refugees and asylum-seekers; improve basic conditions for refugees; repatriate 2,000 Congolese refugees and 10,000 Rwandan refugees (Ibid., par. 14). Current UNHCR plans allow for helping 10,000 Rwandan refugee-returnees, and its focus is primarily short-term bit with an eye to longer-term solutions; it admits its success is dependent on the volatile conditions of the region, but hopes to keep be able to ensure fair treatment for returnees; everything has been complicated by recent fighting in eastern DRC, with 160,00 new people fleeing their homes (Ibid., 15-18).

In terms of resources, UNHCR has over $22.3 million USD available, with $19.9 million available for refugee programs and 2.4 million available for repatriation programs, about half the refugee funds go towards “basic needs and services,” while the vast majority of the repatriation funds go to the same category (Ibid., par. 20).
E. **International Non-Governmental Organization: American Refugee Committee**

The section deals with one NGO’s efforts in working with Rwandan refugees and/or IDPs.

**American Refugee Committee Background**

The American Refugee Committee has been operating for 30 years, working in seven countries and “provides shelter, clean water and sanitation, health care, skills training, microcredit education, protection” and other services (ARC 2010a, par. 1). It defines its mission as follows:

ARC works with its partners and constituencies to provide opportunities and expertise to refugees, displaced people and host communities. We help people survive conflict and crisis and rebuild lives of dignity, health, security and self-sufficiency. ARC is committed to the delivery of programs that ensure measurable quality and lasting impact for the people we serve. (ARC 2010b, par.1).

Furthermore, its vision is that “Every person who participates in an ARC program or project will have a better chance to take control of their life and achieve self sufficiency” (Ibid., par.2). Finally, it also has several guiding principles:

- **Ethics:** We hold ourselves to the highest standards of transparency, accountability and ethical behavior.
- **Dignity:** We preserve and enhance the dignity of the people we serve.
- **Optimism:** We provide hope for those in need to have a better life.
- **Service:** We use a participatory approach to enhance the delivery of our services that is appropriate and relevant to those we serve.
- **Self-sufficiency:** We enhance the self-sufficiency of the people we serve and empower them to rebuild productive lives.
- **Advocacy:** We advocate for the human needs of the people we serve and inspire the world community to respond to their needs.
- **Stewardship:** We are stewards of the human and financial resources we have been given to ensure they serve those with great need. (Ibid., par. 3).

Its work in seven countries is spread across Africa and Asia has “provided health care, clean water, shelter repair, legal aid, trauma counseling, microcredit, community development services, and repatriation assistance to 2.5 million people last year;” in a generals sense, its programs aim to “[u]tilize the knowledge and experience of the people it serves,” “[i]mprove the lives of people in the community,” “[t]rain survivors and build the capacity of the community,” and “[s]ustain themselves [i.e. its aid recipients] years into the future” (Ibid., par. 4-5).

Personnel-wise, ARC is strongly represented by the professional community in the state of Minnesota, including people from the non-profit, business, academic, and medical communities (ARC 2010c.). Of the 2,500 staff, roughly 95% “are local staff or are refugees themselves;” Daniel Wordsworth is the President and CEO and Mike Zeitouny the CFO (ARC 2010d, par. 2-3).
From a financial perspective, ARC puts 89 cents of every dollar it raises towards programs, and has “an A rating from the American Institute of Philanthropy and meets the Better Business Bureau’s careful standards for charity accountability,” while the quality of its efforts is noted “by Reader’s Digest Magazine, Worth Magazine, and Money Magazine” (ARC 2010e, par. 1-2). In 2009, it raised over $31.3 million USD: 2 million in contributions, 7.4 million in UN Grants, 17.1 million in U.S. Government Grants, and 3.5 million in private support contributions among other funding; of 28.2 million in expenses, 25.5 million was spend on programs, 2.7 million on support (ARC 2010f, 26).

American Refugee Committee’s Work in Rwanda

Barry Wheeler is the Rwanda Country Director (ARC 2010d, par. 4). Its country headquarters is based in Kigali, and it works in Gihembe Camp, Kiziba Camp, and Nyabiheke Camp serving 45,000-50,00 Congolese refugees (ARC 2010g, par. 1-2). It has been operational since 1994, and its main operations involve “camp management, healthcare worker training, mother and child care, primary health care, shelter, infrastructure construction, microenterprise development,” and “water and sanitation,” in addition to “programs combating gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS” and “successful income generation programs” (Ibid., par. 3-4).

ARC is present in all three major refugee camps in Rwanda, actually having built one of them, Nyabiheke Camp, which has taken 5,000 refugees from the DRC since 2005; they built “roads, bridges, shelters, latrines, storage warehouses, and health centers” and started taking in refugees less than a month after construction began, and particularly emphasize a borehole for a tap aquifer that gives the camp 100,000 liters of clean water every day (Ibid., par. 4-5). Two years later, it expanded the camp to increase its capacity to 7,000 refugees, and also worked in 2006 with UNICEF to construct schools for children living in Rwanda’s camps. It has HIV/AIDS treatment, awareness and prevention programs in two of the three camps, and job/income oriented programs in all three major camps (Ibid., par. 5-6).

ARC hopes to expand its operations should conditions in the DRC can improve, and is preparing for possible peace and repatriation in the DRC (Ibid., par. 7).
**List of Sources**


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