The relative inactivity post-U.S. aid package passing was partly a given, as Ukraine would obviously need some time to receive and distribute the U.S. aid. But for those wondering what Ukraine was planning and had up its sleeve, this Kursk operation might just give us a clue to the larger military intentions of Ukraine.
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By Brian E. Frydenborg (Twitter @bfry1981, LinkedIn, Facebook, Substack with exclusive informal content) August 11, 2024; see my related August 15 Twitter thread on the Kursk operation, what led to it, & its importance; because of YOU, Real Context News surpassed one million content views on January 1, 2023, but I still need your help, please keep sharing my work and consider also donating! Real Context News produces commissioned content for clients upon request at its discretion.
SILVER SPRING—I know it has been some time since I have written about Ukraine, with personal reasons having played a role in this, including losing a Democratic U.S. Senate primary campaign in Maryland (but hey, I came in 5th out of 10 candidates in my first race ever against some opponents with a lot more staff, much more money, and far deeper roots in the state, but now make sure you support winner Angela Alsobrooks in the fall!). But aside from my own personal hectic situation, the fact is that compared to the previous massive Ukrainian counterattacks, previous smaller Ukrainian-supported Russian rebel incursions into Russia, spectacular victories of Ukraine against the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s ill-fated rebellion against the Kremlin, and Russia’s suicidal Pyrrhic “victories,” very little exciting large-scale developments have happened until this thus-far successful operation in Russia being conducted by Ukraine. Of course, there have been the standard war-criminal barbarity of the Russians in targeting and massacring Ukrainian civilians throughout this period in addition to the standard smaller-scale Russian offenses by a Russian military incapable of sustaining large-scale offensives, offensives that made mild-to-no progress while Ukraine was running out of ammunition and Republicans under Trump’s sway were holding up Ukrainian aid—a telling fact that displays Russia’s impotence as it was unable to do more when Ukraine was at its weakest.
Setting Up This New Counteroffensive
But now that that massive aid package finally passed in late April some three-and-a-half months ago, many including myself were wondering how soon how much of that $61 billion in U.S. aid would be disbursed and how soon that could allow Ukraine to be in a position to launch a major successful counteroffensive.
Having received billions of dollars in aid from the U.S. and other allies, we have now seen the beginning of what can hardly be called a minor incursion into Russia, not of Ukrainian-allied-and-supported Russian rebel units—the Russian Volunteer Corps (R.D.K.) and the Free Russia Legion (also translated as the Freedom of Russia Legion or Liberty of Russia Legion) that raided Russia earlier—but of actual Ukrainian forces themselves. For ground combat, this is the most Ukraine has taken the actual fight to the Russians’ actual home territory and it is unprecedented and an utter humiliation for Russia and Putin (Putin’s face in this clip speaks volumes). Even earlier, the fact that this was being undertaken by Ukrainian, and not Russian rebel units, suggested that this is was likely going to be much more than a raid, could even be a major operation. Now, it is obvious that this is a major operation involving many Ukrainian troops. And the beauty of all this is that this could very much be the beginning of a dramatically different phase of the war that could very well transform it.
How so? I wrote well over a year ago, after a series of dramatic raids by the aforementioned Russian rebels into Russia and Ukrainian drone strikes deep into Russia hitting Russian bases and even Moscow itself, that such operations had the potential to cause Russia to dramatically drain its combat power and strength from the front lines in Ukraine and that this, in turn, would leave Russia very vulnerable to massive Ukrainian counterattacks.
Well, we can think of what we saw before with the Russian rebel forces as mini-preview versions of what we are seeing now, providing a lot of intelligence on the borderlands on the Russian side. And, as I have noted before, Ukraine—unlike Russia—values the lives of its troops and does not try to rush its operations but puts a lot of effort into planning, exercising prudence. So it prepared on its own timetable, meticulously, and patiently, and we can be certain that Ukraine has put a tremendous amount of time and effort into planning what is now unfolding.
And that is why it is unfolding so well for Ukraine right now.
Kursk Crumbling!
For what is unfolding is the most spectacular, impressive development in a long time, with Ukraine taking more Russian territory in days than Russia has taken as far as Ukrainian territory in months. Or, Russia has lost far more of its own territory in just a few days than Ukraine has lost in terms of its own territory in months, if you prefer. To quantify this, we’re talking roughly between 500-850 km2, and that is almost certainly outdated and smaller than where things are currently as Ukraine and those posting publicly about this siding with Ukraine are exceptionally careful about operations security, or OPSEC (in contrast to Russian OPSEC, which is abysmal in general and specifically so in Kursk at the moment).
What we are seeing now in Ukraine is not raid, then, but a major effort to take and intend to hold and be able to hold Russian territory. If the raids from before showed Russia was not able to effectively defend its own territory from potential attack and, that like its positions in Ukraine, it had no layered defense in depth in its own territory, the current operation is the realization of that potential, with disastrous consequences for Russia. Indeed, Ukraine has taken a significant amount of territory in Russia’s Kursk Oblast—well-known in the hearts of Russians as the site of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany during World War II from July-August 1943 in the largest tank battle in the history of the world and including today—and has also begun to advance into Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, long staging areas for Russian attacks on Ukaine. But now the tables have turned, and turned dramatically and suddenly as Ukraine outmaneuvers Russia inside Russia again and again in recent days.
And let’s be clear, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and his regime have been absolutely embarrassed, it being clear that Russia’s military was incapable both of anticipating the Ukrainian invasion and of putting together a competent defense for its early phase: even Russian military bloggers (“milbloggers”) are openly acknowledging this. There is even a hilarious “Belgorod People’s Republic” Twitter account that is trolling Russia on a next level. Things are unfolding as rapidly as the great Ukrainian counteroffensives earlier in the war, except this one is inside Russian territory.
Why should this operation be transformational for this war? Because Ukraine is attacking in force inside Russia with high quality troops and high-quality, NATO-level equipment, and Russian security forces and military left behind in Russia are generally not of high-quality (often very poorly-trained green conscripts), nor well equipped: the most seasoned troops with the “better” Russian equipment (“best” is really too strong) are spread throughout the frontline in Ukraine and there are not even that many: most troops in Ukraine at this point in the war, after so many Russian casualties and so much Russian equipment destroyed, are poorly-trained and with outdated equipment (Russia is literally throwing T-62M tanks at the Ukrainians in Kursk Oblast, tanks that are 1983 upgrades of a 1961 tank that was itself an upgrade of a 1958 model, all while Ukraine takes far better care of its equipment than Russia). This means that Putin is going to have to remove large numbers of better troops and better equipment from the front lines in Ukraine, and this means there will almost certainly be collapses of the Russian lines in Ukraine. Already, the number of Russian attacks in Ukraine are declining dramatically because of Ukraine’s Kursk invasion as Russia withdraws troops from Ukraine to face the threat in Kursk. It’s basic math, as I have noted before.
And the choice for Putin is clear: cannibalize key parts of the Russian lines in Ukraine, almost certainly leading to major Ukrainian breakthroughs there, or allow Ukraine to occupy, control, and demilitarize large swathes of Russia on Ukraine’s border. Because as it stands now, Ukraine has smashed through the rear support lines of the Russian right flank of the entire war effort and will be able to threaten and roll up a large chunk of the Russian line in the north of Ukraine unless a dramatic redeployment of Russian troops from those Ukrainian lines occurs. Again, simple math. And Russia will have to keep a closer eye on other border areas, too, further diverting resources from the front lines in Ukraine. So make no doubt about it, this is the weakest Putin has been since Prigozhin was approaching the gates of Moscow, but unlike with the late Prigozhin, Putin has no way to manipulate the Ukrainians into to giving up their march into Russia without major concessions Putin would be unwilling to entertain and the Ukrainians are in a prime position to do massive damage to both the whole Russian military position in Ukraine as well as the ability of Russia to even use these border regions to stage any further military operations against Ukrainian territory.
Ukraine Railroading Russia
If you think I am exaggerating, I am not. And for this next section, I would like to thank Trent Telenko and Intelschizo from Twitter for much of what I will explain here (not that I always accept everything from any particular account, but really appreciated what I cite here). Russia’s land forces—“more so than any other military”—are highly dependent on its rail network to supply their troops and move them and their equipment. And one of the main Russia rail lines supporting the war for a large part of the front line—the Lgov-Belgorod Line—has now been severed during this operations and is partly under Ukrainian control along with the Lgov-Vorozbha line, to the point that they have taken over and will be able to use Russia’s own rail lines to rapidly move in its own heavy equipment into the area. Ukraine is already in a strong position and will be dug in with excellent fields of fire, controlling the heights in the area and using those heights to dominate the roads that operate in between and around this high ground, creating ideal kills zones and already making it hard for Russia to reinforce or counterattack. This means Ukraine is establishing a solid bridgehead into Kursk Oblast around the key crossroads town of Sudzha, which contains one of Russia’s major operational natural gas line Gazprom metering stations for Europe, with nearly half of Russia’s gas exports to Europe passing by pipeline through Sudzha in 2023. Protecting this bridgehead, among other defenses, is a solid buffer zone where Ukraine’s drones can easily monitor and hit enemy targets.
As a result, we even have multiple examples of cheap Ukrainian drones taking out Russian military helicopters midflight and Ukraine has already inflicted heavy casualties on the disorganized Russian defenders, even taking many Russian personnel as prisoners. Also, a major Ukrainian drone attack pretty much destroyed a nearby Russian military airbase in Lipetsk, making lack of air support a real issue for the Russians, and Ukraine is also already hitting neighboring Voronezh Oblast with drone strikes.
The other main rail line Russia might have used nearby, the Oryol Line, has already been well-targeted by Ukraine and is unusable, so, essentially, what has happened is that Ukraine has or is just on the cusp of making it impossible for Russia to send supplies, troops, or equipment by rail from Moscow and the rest of the north to the frontline without going far, far out of its way by using other circuitous rail lines that will severely delay any attempt to move anything from there to the front. Resupplying and reinforcing using rail lines from the east, Russia is facing dramatically less effective, far longer logistical routes that will make the Russian army’s already miserable logistics situation far more miserable. And a lot of these rail lines will be susceptible to further sabotage and attacks and will also likely suffer from overuse and maintenance issues as Russia panics in response to Ukrainian offensive operations going deeper into Russia. And those troops will be exhausted when they finally arrive and subject to Ukrainian attacks while en route.
What all this means is Russia is in a lot of trouble not just in Ukraine but also in Russia. And I don’t just mean militarily: as I have noted in the past before Prigozhin’s rebellion, which I essentially predicted, and as I noted with Prigozhin’s rebellion how that would plant mental seeds of further rebellion, such failures in the past in Russian history have provoked rebellion and revolution inside Russian history, including defections of whole military units. If things collapse rapidly for Russia inside Russia and Ukraine in the coming weeks and months, I would not be surprised if sizable Russian military formations defect in whole and rapidly march on Moscow to overthrow Putin. Again, I am not saying this will definitely happen specifically because of this operation or soon, but I would not be surprised and have noted this possibility for some time (and do see Putin’s downfall coming at some point as a consequence of this disastrously and pathetically mismanaged war of colonialist imperialism). Russians’ confidence in Putin has already been shattered time and time again as the reality of this war consistently keeps piercing Putin’s propaganda bubble, from Russia’s insanely high casualties to the sinking of the Black Sea flagship the Moskva, but significant amounts of actual Russian territory being taken and occupied by Ukraine and used to stage further attacks deeper inside Russia is a whole other level of undeniable failure, failure that falls squarely on Putin and the people he has personally chosen to run this failing war.
Russia, Still Screwed and Now More Screwed
Even if there aren’t internal revolts against the Kremlin in the coming weeks and months, Russia’s military situation is just terrible now to an even higher degree with these most recent developments. For, as I noted before, if Russia could barely advance against Ukraine when it was running out of ammunition while Republicans pushed by Trump shamefully blocked Biden Administration aid to Ukraine, it was only going to get worse for Russia once that aid started flowing from the U.S. again, and now, three-and-a-half months later, it’s certainly getting worse for Russia and is only now going to get dramatically worse for Russia after the events of the past few days.
Brian’s Ukraine analysis has been praised by: Mykhailo Podolyak, a top advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky; the Ukraine Territorial Defense Forces; Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, U.S. Army (Ret.), former commanding general, U.S. Army Europe; Scott Shane, two-time Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist formerly of The New York Times & Baltimore Sun (and featured in HBO’s The Wire, playing himself); Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-IL), one of the only Republicans to stand up to Trump and member of the January 6th Committee; and Orwell Prize-winning journalist Jenni Russell, among others.
See all Brian’s Ukraine coverage here
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Also see Brian’s eBook, A Song of Gas and Politics: How Ukraine Is at the Center of Trump-Russia, or, Ukrainegate: A “New” Phase in the Trump-Russia Saga Made from Recycled Materials, available for Amazon Kindle and Barnes & Noble Nook (preview here).
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